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Hedonic-Loss Damages That Optimally Deter: An
Alternative to “Value of a Statistical Life” That
Focuses on Both Decedent and Tortfeasor
MICHAEL PRESSMAN†
Plaintiffs in wrongful-death suits typically are unable to recover for the decedent’s “hedonic
loss”—the loss of happiness (or wellbeing) incurred as a result of the lost life-years themselves.
Although this omission might not be a mistake on a backward-looking account of tort law
(because the decedent is dead and arguably cannot be compensated), it is problematic on a
forward-looking account of tort law, because it results in under-deterrence of activities causing
death. Thus, we must provide an answer to the tricky question of what dollar sum should be
assigned to the loss of life. The dominant framework among legal theorists for thinking about how
tort law should determine the dollar sum is the “value of a statistical life” (VSL). In this Article,
however, I argue that the VSL approach is mistaken. I explain why, propose an alternative, and
explore the wide-ranging implications of my analysis.
If we are to provide a monetary remedy for the decedent’s lost happiness, we need to translate
the lost happiness into a monetary sum. The VSL approach does so on the decedent’s “utility
curve,” thus taking the decedent’s wealth into account in determining the damages sum, with the
potential tortfeasor then internalizing this monetary cost. This is a mistake. For the incentives to
be optimal, we want the potential tortfeasor to instead internalize the amount of happiness loss
that would be incurred by the decedent. Therefore, my account carries out the happiness-tomoney translation on the potential tortfeasor’s “utility curve”—thus taking into account the
potential tortfeasor’s wealth and not the decedent’s wealth.
The implications of my analysis extend beyond the context of wrongful death, providing us with
important insights about tort law more generally, and, more generally still, about law on the
whole. In particular, my analysis casts doubt on foundational assumptions underlying the lawand-economics literature—simultaneously providing a new framework that law-and-economics
theorists should employ.

† Research Fellow at the Civil Jury Project at NYU School of Law; B.A., Philosophy, Stanford
University, 2006; M.A., Philosophy, Stanford University, 2006; J.D., Stanford Law School, 2010; Ph.D.,
Philosophy, University of Southern California, 2018. For their insightful comments, I am indebted to: Jennifer
Arlen, Aditi Bagchi, Rabia Belt, Tommy Bennett, Ilya Beylin, Ryan Bubb, Jonathan Choi, Patrick Corrigan,
Courtney Cox, Guus Duindam, Barbara Fried, Mark Geistfeld, Jacob Goldin, Bob Gordon, Esther Hong, Greg
Keating, Rebecca Kysar, Ethan Leib, Nancy Marder, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Alexander Reinert, Christopher
Schmidt, Cathy Sharkey, Jed Shugerman, and Ben Zipursky.
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INTRODUCTION
In almost all states, plaintiffs in wrongful-death suits are unable to recover
for the decedent’s “hedonic loss”—the loss of happiness1 incurred as a result of
the lost life-years themselves.2 In those few states in which they can, they often
do not, and, even when they do, there is much confusion and non-uniformity in
determining damages sums.3 Because the decedent is dead and cannot be
compensated, this omission might not be a mistake on a backward-looking
account of tort law, according to which the purpose of tort is to provide just
compensation. But Cass Sunstein and Eric Posner4 have argued that the
unavailability of damages for hedonic loss is highly problematic on a forwardlooking account of tort law, which seeks to bring about optimal incentives for
future potential tortfeasors. According to them, because tortfeasors are not now
required to internalize all of the costs of their torts, the status quo results in
under-deterrence of activities causing death.5 Indeed, it is often “cheaper for the
defendant to kill the plaintiff than to injure him.”6 As an example, between 1984
and 1993 in New York City,7 the average jury verdict was $1 million in cases of
wrongful death, $3 million in cases of brain damage, and $500,000 in cases of a
herniated disc.8 A wrongful death, however, arguably is much more than twice
as bad as a herniated disc; but these are the typical relative damages measures—
and they have been for at least a century.9
I agree with Sunstein and Posner that the unavailability of damages for
hedonic loss is highly problematic on a forward-looking account of tort law. The
next step, however, is to determine what dollar sum should be assigned to the
loss of life. Answering this question is tricky because, while in typical cases of

1. Throughout this Article, I will frequently use the words “happiness,” “utility,” and “wellbeing.” I intend
for all of these words to be synonymous, and I intend for each of them to be understood broadly enough to
capture just about any view that the reader might have about the goodness in life that makes life worth living.
2. A small minority of “hedonic-loss states” (Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and New
Mexico) do allow compensation for “hedonic loss” incurred by the decedent as a result of his lost years of life.
See Durham v. Marberry, 156 S.W.3d 242, 244–46 (Ark. 2004); Katsetos v. Nolan, 368 A.2d 172, 183 (Conn.
1976); Montalvo v. Lapez, 884 P.2d 345, 365 (Haw. 1994); Marcotte v. Timberlane/Hampstead Sch. Dist., 733
A.2d 394, 400–01 (N.H. 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-2-1 (2021); Smith v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 214 F.3d 1235,
1245–46 (10th Cir. 2000) (New Mexico).
3. See supra note 2.
4. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005).
5. Id. at 587, 598. Jennifer Arlen also made this point in her 1985 note, An Economic Analysis of Tort
Damages for Wrongful Death, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1113, 1116–17 (1985).
6. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984); see also Mark A. Geistfeld, The Principle of Misalignment:
Duty, Damages, and the Nature of Tort Liability, 121 YALE L.J. 142, 159–60 (2011).
7. Although this is not a recent example, it indeed is illustrative of typical relative damages amounts today
across jurisdictions in the United States.
8. See Edward A. Adams, Venue Crucial to Tort Awards: Study: City Verdicts Depend on Counties, N.Y.
L.J., Apr. 4, 1994, at 1.
9. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 84 (1972). Indeed, compensatory
damages in wrongful death cases sometimes can be zero. Romo v. Ford Motor Co., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 793, 811 (Ct.
App. 2003); Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 160.
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valuing loss we can rely on a plaintiff’s willingness to pay/accept, in the context
of death we cannot because—leaving aside motivations like altruism—people
would not accept any dollar sum in exchange for their lives. Thus, we seemingly
must pursue a construct.
Sunstein and Posner argue that tort law should adopt a version (and ideally
a more individuated version) of the “value of a statistical life” (VSL), which is
employed by regulatory law to value lives for cost-benefit analyses.10 In short,
VSL determines the dollar sum that is the cost of a lost life by extrapolating from
labor-force decisions and consumption decisions where people pay/accept
certain sums of money to avoid/incur an increased chance of death of 1/10,000.11
Sunstein and Posner and numerous other legal scholars advocating for the use
of VSL in tort law recognize that there are a number of serious concerns about
the chain of inferences employed in using VSL.12 For instance: Do people truly
make such labor-force decisions freely? And do they know what the
probabilities of death they confront are? Sunstein and Posner argue that these
are merely questions of fine-tuning and that, while the numbers can be refined,
the general approach is correct.13 Further, since 2005, Sunstein and many other
legal scholars have worked to fine-tune the VSL approach.14 Thus, the VSL
approach is the dominant framework for thinking about how tort law should
determine a dollar sum for hedonic loss.
I, however, believe that the VSL approach is mistaken—and for reasons
wholly separate from the “fine-tuning” issues that do indeed plague it. In this
Article I explain why, and I propose an alternative. I then argue that the
implications of my analysis extend beyond the context of wrongful death,
providing us with important insights about tort law more generally, and, more
generally still, about law on the whole. In particular, my analysis casts doubt on
foundational assumptions underlying the law-and-economics literature—
10. See, for example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s regulations regarding motor
vehicle safety standards. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Roof Crush Resistance, 75 Fed. Reg. 17,605,
17,612 (Apr. 7, 2010) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 571).
11. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 551.
12. See, e.g., id.; Cass R. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J. 385, 417–18
(2004) [hereinafter Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation]; Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Lives, LifeYears, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205, 211–12 (2004) [hereinafter Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years,
and Willingness to Pay]; Cass R. Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some Clarifications and Puzzles, 4 J.
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 237, 249–51 (2013) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some
Clarifications and Puzzles]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY STATE (2014);
Robert Cooter & David DePianto, Community Versus Market Values of Life, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 713,
760–65 (2016); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 869, 887–96 (1998); Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, 83 S.
CAL. L. REV. 229, 238–42 (2010).
13. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 584.
14. See, e.g., id. at 584–92; Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, supra note 12, at 404–21;
Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, supra note 12, at 226–40; Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical
Life: Some Clarifications and Puzzles, supra note 12, at 238; SUNSTEIN, supra note 12; Cooter & DePianto,
supra note 12, at 755–66; Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 12, at 873–76; Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 12, at
238–42.
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simultaneously providing a new framework that law-and-economics theorists
should employ.
If we are to provide a monetary remedy for the loss of happiness to the
decedent (as I agree we should, so as to bring about optimal deterrence), we will
at some point need to translate the lost happiness into a monetary sum. The VSL
approach does so on the decedent’s “utility curve,”15 thus taking the decedent’s
wealth into account,16 but this is a mistake. That this is a mistake can be shown
in a few ways, one of which is the following:
An individuated VSL approach would give us the result that someone who
is very poor might have a VSL of, say, $100, whereas someone who is very rich
might have a VSL of, say $1,000,000 (as a result of the differing amounts that
they would spend to avoid a 1/10,000 chance of death). This would give us the
result that a tortfeasor would incur a cost of only $100 if she kills Poor, but a
cost of $1,000,000 if she kills Rich. In addition to it seeming, equitably, that the
decedent’s wealth should not be relevant to the damages, this disparity is also
suboptimal from an efficiency standpoint. Stipulating that the happiness loss to
Rich and Poor as a result of their premature deaths is the same, optimal
incentives would induce the same care to prevent their deaths. The VSL
approach therefore risks greatly under-deterring the killing of Poor and greatly
over-deterring the killing of Rich. What this shows us is that the happiness-tomoney translation is happening at the incorrect point in the analysis of our topic.
Although the disparity in damages between Rich and Poor could be
avoided by employing a uniform VSL sum, I will argue that we should ideally
have an individuated tort system, and, crucially, that even a uniform VSL sum
would be inefficient because it is the tortfeasor’s wealth—not the decedent’s—
that is relevant for determining optimal incentives. I will argue that for the
incentives to be optimal, we want the potential tortfeasor to internalize the
amount of happiness loss that would be incurred by the decedent. This means
that the tortfeasor should be incentivized to expend up to the amount of
happiness that would be lost by the victim (if killed) to prevent this loss of the
victim. These incentives would be brought about by having a damages rule that
would force the tortfeasor to incur this happiness loss when paying tort damages.
Damages thus should be set at the dollar sum that, if paid by the tortfeasor, would
bring about a happiness loss to the tortfeasor equal to the happiness loss incurred
by the decedent as a result of his premature death. Thus, on my account, the
happiness-to-money translation occurs on the tortfeasor’s utility curve. This is
importantly different from the VSL approach, which carries out the happinessto-money translation on the decedent’s utility curve.

15. See Cooter & DePianto, supra note 12, at 721; Arlen, supra note 5, at 1125. A utility curve is a graph
that plots utility on the y-axis as a function of some good (for example, money) on the x-axis, thus (in the case
of money) showing how a person’s utility level varies as a function of how much money he or she has.
16. See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 580.
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In addition, I show that even in cases not involving loss of life, optimal
damages sums (from a forward-looking perspective) should in theory be
determined by exploring the defendant’s utility curve, and not that of the
plaintiff. This is a broad finding that runs counter to the commonly accepted
theories underlying the law-and-economics literature, and, in particular, the
willingness-to-pay literature, both of which focus on the plaintiff’s utility curve.
In practice, however, considering only the plaintiff’s utility curve in cases
not involving death can often be justified either by its greater administrability or
by other practical efficiency benefits that can be effectuated by doing so. In cases
of death, however, I argue that, from a forward-looking perspective, the
defendant’s utility curve should be used even in practice.
Although the vast majority of the Article explores these topics exclusively
through a forward-looking lens, toward the end I expand my focus to include the
backward-looking account of tort law, and I explore how it affects my proposal.
I argue that in the context of non-death cases, the backward-looking account
provides a strong explanation for why we might, in practice, use the utility
curves of plaintiffs. In the context of death cases, however, we seemingly have
a situation where compensation is not possible, yet deterrence is. Thus, even if
one typically thinks that the forward-looking account and backward-looking
accounts of tort are both intrinsically part of the picture, it seems that death cases
are unique in that compensation for the hedonic loss arguably is off the table,
and all that remains is potential deterrence of activities that might cause hedonic
loss. Thus, I conclude that, in death cases, my proposal, couched in the forwardlooking account, should indeed be implemented. After coming to this
conclusion, I further explore the interesting underlying finding that death cases
are uniquely positioned to teach us about the relationship between forwardlooking and backward-looking accounts of tort law because death cases enable
us to explore the forward-looking account in a rare instance when it arguably is
not accompanied by the backward-looking account.
In addition to offering my positive proposal for death cases, I also consider
several theoretical and practical issues that arise in implementing it, and I offer
a number of proposals for reform. Many of these proposed reforms will aim to
learn from the context of punitive damages; there, unlike in most other areas of
damages, defendants’ wealth is already considered relevant to the determination
of damages—as I argue it should be in the context of wrongful death.
In the course of making the Article’s arguments against the VSL approach
and in favor of my proposed alternative, I argue against current wisdom on the
topic, including the views of Sunstein, Posner, Viscusi, Polinsky, Shavell, Arlen,
and Geistfeld, among others.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part I, I provide important background.
First, I provide an overview of the current state of the law, which does not allow
recovery for a decedent’s hedonic loss. Then, I explain the VSL approach to
determining the dollar figure to be used as compensation for lost life and argue
that common “fine-tuning” criticisms of it are unlikely to be fatal. Next, after
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describing a number of specific versions of the VSL approach that have been
espoused by various legal theorists, I canvas some alternative approaches to
determining such damages and argue none of them is promising. This overview
of the literature shows that VSL represents the dominant framework for thinking
about how tort law should determine the dollar value for a decedent’s hedonic
loss.
In Part II, I give my reasons for thinking that the VSL approach is
mistaken—reasons that are wholly separate from the “fine-tuning” issues that
do indeed plague it. In my view, the problem with the VSL account is that it
carries out the happiness-to-money translation on the decedent’s utility curve. In
Part II, I provide two different ways of showing why this is a problem. The
second of these reasons then segues well into an articulation of my own
alternative proposal for how to determine the dollar sum to attribute to a
decedent’s hedonic loss—the key feature of which is that it carries out the
happiness-to-money translation on the tortfeasor’s utility curve instead of on the
decedent’s.
Then, in Part III, I describe the various details of my alternative proposal—
some details of which are theoretical, and others of which are practical and
procedural. Toward the end of Part III, I argue that my analysis provides us with
an important insight about tort law more generally (and, even more generally,
about law-and-economics approaches to law on the whole): Even in cases not
involving death, damages sums (from a forward-looking perspective) should in
theory be determined by exploring the tortfeasor’s utility curve and not that of
the plaintiff.17 The extension of my theory to areas in tort not involving death—
and to areas of the law other than tort—serves not only to provide more general
insights, but also to provide further support for my main positive proposal
regarding how to determine which dollar sum to attribute to a decedent’s hedonic
loss in wrongful-death cases.
In Part IV, I raise and respond to a number of objections that one might
have in response to my positive proposal. In Part V, I then (1) explain why (from
a forward-looking perspective), in death cases, we should not only adopt my
account in theory, but also implement it in practice; (2) expand my focus to
include consideration of the backward-looking account—both for the purpose of
exploring how it affects my proposal and for the purpose of discussing how the
death case is uniquely positioned to teach us about the relationship between the
two accounts; and (3) I briefly describe concerns that could be raised about
17. Although this Article briefly touches upon the extensions for non-death cases and non-tort cases of this
Article’s proposal for death cases, these extensions are only summarized and addressed briefly. The full
discussion of how this Article’s proposal applies in non-death cases can be found in a separate article of mine.
See Michael Pressman, The Relevance of Defendants’ Wealth for Forward-Looking, Backward-Looking, and
Mixed Accounts of Tort Damages, 95 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619 (2021). In that article, I provide an in-depth
exploration of cases not involving death and explain why, despite prima facie appearances to the contrary, my
theory, as discussed in the death context, is both descriptively and normatively plausible in the non-death
context—at least in theory, even if not in practice.
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whether the use of tort law in the way I propose in this Article is the best legal
machinery we have (as opposed to, say, criminal law or punitive damages) for
pursuing this Article’s goals. Lastly, I bring the Article to a close with a brief
conclusion.

I. BACKGROUND
A. OVERVIEW OF THE STATE OF THE LAW AND THE PROBLEMS WITH IT
There are several things plaintiffs can recover for in wrongful death suits
in tort—regardless of whether it technically is a “survival action”18 (brought by
the decedent’s estate), or a “wrongful-death action”19 (brought by, for example,
a decedent’s spouse on behalf of the decedent). Among the things that plaintiffs
can recover for in these suits are lost financial support for the surviving spouse
(which is a function of the decedent’s income, projected consumption, and so
on), consortium, and pain and suffering experienced by the decedent himself
before his death.20
One notable omission from this list, however, is damages for the “hedonic
loss” incurred by the decedent by having his life shortened—that is, the loss of
happiness (or, said differently, “life’s pleasures”21) that the decedent would have
experienced in his future years of life but for his premature death.22 Almost no
state permits recovery for such losses. A small minority of “hedonic-loss states”
do allow compensation for “hedonic loss” incurred by the decedent as a result
of his lost years of life.23 But, even in these states, courts do not always provide
recovery for the hedonic loss caused by the lost years, and, where they do, there
is no clear system for calculating these damages, and the courts’ opinions are
rife with confusion.24
Arguably, the purposes of tort law are both (1) backward-looking (to
provide a plaintiff with compensation for the losses he has incurred, thus
attempting to make him whole),25 and (2) forward-looking (for damage awards
to provide the optimally efficient incentives for future potential tortfeasors).26 In
18. See Arlen, supra note 5, at 1117–18.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., In re Delmoro, 48 Misc. 3d 628, 632–33 (Sur. Ct. 2015).
21. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 544.
22. See id. at 569–70.
23. See cases cited supra note 2.
24. See cases cited supra note 2; see also Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 545.
25. For examples of well-known articulations of corrective justice theory (a main example of a backwardlooking theory), see Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. REV. 403 (1992); Jules L. Coleman, The
Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed., 1995);
JULES L. COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY
(2001); ERNEST J. WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE (2012).
26. For examples of well-known articulations of the forward-looking, law-and-economics view, see GUIDO
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); Richard A. Posner, Wealth
Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra
note 25, at 99.
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straightforward cases, these two goals can be brought about by requiring the
tortfeasor to compensate the plaintiff for his losses, thus simultaneously: (1)
making the plaintiff whole; and (2) bringing it about that future potential
tortfeasors internalize the externalities that they would otherwise impose, thus
leading to efficient behavior.27
It may seem that the current state of the law is defensible from the
backward-looking perspective. After all, it is true that the decedent himself
cannot be compensated—indeed, he is not even in existence and thus cannot
receive money. While perhaps the family could recover these sums, the family
is (ideally) already being compensated for ways in which they are harmed, and
the focus of this category of damages (“hedonic loss”) is on a form of loss that
is to the decedent himself—namely for his lost years of life. Awarding sums for
the decedent’s hedonic losses to the family would constitute a windfall, and it
seems that for the limited purpose of this type of loss, there might be no problem
(through the backward-looking lens of tort law) with the current state of the law
because the decedent indeed cannot be compensated. From a backward-looking
perspective, the inability to recover for “hedonic loss” might be right. One
might, however, deny that it is right even through a backward-looking lens, and
one might say that the decedent’s estate should be compensated and its failure
to be compensated renders the current state of the law wrong even through a
backward-looking lens. After all, a decedent’s estate is a legal fiction that
survives the decedent’s death and perhaps the failure to compensate the
decedent’s estate for the “hedonic loss” does indeed show the state of the law to
be a mistake even through a backward-looking lens. I leave this question aside
and simply state that a strong case can be made that with respect to the backwardlooking lens, the current state of the law is not making a mistake.
Even if there is no mistake with the current state of the law if looked at
through the backward-looking lens, this is not so if looked at through a forwardlooking lens. On a forward-looking account, it seems that a failure to require
tortfeasors to pay the cost associated with the hedonic loss to the decedent would
be a mistake, even if the person who incurred the loss can no longer be
compensated. This is because failing to include the cost of the hedonic loss in
the damages sum would understate (potentially grossly) the (hedonic) cost of the
tortfeasor’s behavior. All else equal, happy people do not want to die, and we
typically think a person incurs a cost by being killed—even if he cannot be
compensated for this. Thus, the current state of the law seemingly under-deters
behavior that could result in killing people. Without requiring the tortfeasor to
pay any cost capturing the loss to the decedent, the law cannot provide optimal
incentives. Consider, for example, the counterintuitive implication of the current
state of the law that, all else equal, it could be better for a tortfeasor for his

27. See Michael Pressman, The Compatibility of Forward-Looking and Backward-Looking Accounts of
Tort Law, 15 U.N.H. L. REV. 45, 75 (2016).
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behavior to leave a victim dead than to leave the victim injured.28 Indeed, as
mentioned in the Introduction, it is often cheaper for the defendant to kill the
plaintiff than to injure him, and between 1984 and 1993 in New York City, the
average jury verdict was $1 million in cases of wrongful death and $3 million in
cases of brain damage (and $500,000 in cases of a herniated disc—which, when
compared to the average verdicts for wrongful death, is particularly
noteworthy).29
In sum, it seems that even if the current state of the law in this domain is
not making a mistake from a backward-looking perspective (and an argument
could be made that it is making a mistake even from a backward-looking
perspective as well), it is making a mistake from a forward-looking perspective.
Tort law thus should allow for damages for a decedent’s hedonic loss.
Regardless of whether the money for “hedonic loss” would go to the family of
the decedent, to the state (perhaps into a pool to provide money to future
wrongful death plaintiffs who have cases against poor and thus relatively
judgment-proof defendants), or to whomever else, what seems necessary is that
the tortfeasor be required to pay damages not only for the various other aspects
of wrongful death suits that they are currently required to pay damages for, but
that they also be required to pay damages for the hedonic loss incurred by the
decedent for his lost years of life.
Even if one were on board with this forward-looking claim, if one thinks
that there is currently no mistake on a backward-looking account, one might be
concerned that bringing about a change to fix the mistake through the forwardlooking lens might introduce a mistake (that is, too much compensation) through
the backward-looking lens. This concern could be avoided, however, as alluded
to above, by various possible ways of requiring tortfeasors to pay for hedonic
loss but having these sums get paid not to the family of the decedent but rather
to the state. Thus, requiring tortfeasors to pay for a decedent’s “hedonic loss” is
not problematic from the backward-looking perspective even if it turns out to
not be required by it. Conversely, it enables us to fix what is clearly a mistake in
the law from the forward-looking perspective.
Before continuing, however, it is worth flagging that although Sunstein and
Posner, Arlen, and many authors to be discussed below in Part I.B (for example,
Cooter and DePianto and Shavell and Polinsky)30 agree that there should be
recovery for a decedent’s loss, so as to avoid under-deterrence, not all theorists
agree on this point. Some theorists argue that allowing recovery for a decedent’s
hedonic loss would make damages sums inefficiently high and thus bring about
28. Of course, punitive damages for intentional behavior and also criminal law could in many cases prevent
tortfeasors from actually ever confronting these perverse incentives, but there might be situations where the
perverse incentives do, in practice, still remain; further, even if punitive damages and criminal consequences
fully mitigated these perverse incentives in practice, it still would be the case that from the narrower perspective
of tort law’s account of compensation the current state of the law would have this odd counterintuitive feature.
29. See supra notes 1–17 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part I.B.
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over-deterrence.31 However, although perhaps reasonable minds can differ on
whether there should be recovery for a decedent’s hedonic loss in order to bring
about optimal incentives, I will not debate this further, and, going forward, I will
assume that there indeed should be recovery for a decedent’s hedonic loss.
B. THE SUNSTEIN / POSNER SUGGESTION FOR REFORM: USING “VALUE OF A
STATISTICAL LIFE” (VSL)
Determining that tort law should allow for damages for the hedonic loss
incurred by the decedent is the first key step away from the status quo, and not
only do I espouse this, but so too do Cass Sunstein and Eric Posner (hereinafter
“S&P”) in their 2005 article Dollars and Death.32 They and I are in agreement
on this score. The next key step, however, in arguing for this reform, is to address
the question of how to determine how much a decedent’s hedonic loss should be
worth in terms of dollars—that is, the question of how much a tortfeasor should
have to pay in damages for causing the decedent’s hedonic loss. This is a very
tricky question to answer.
As S&P say, some people will say that life is priceless and thus it is
demeaning, and cheapens life, to try to put a value on it.33 But, as S&P note, it
seems much more demeaning to stick with the status quo (providing zero dollars
for the hedonic loss) than it would be to assign a dollar sum to the hedonic loss.34
We want the sum to be greater than zero.
Typically, when valuing things, we can either ask or infer from people’s
actions what they are willing to pay (“WTP”) for something (or to avoid
something), or, similarly, what they would be willing to accept (“WTA”) for

31. See W. Kip Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensation for Wrongful Death
and Personal Injury, 20 J. FORENSIC ECON. 113, 126–27 (2007) [hereinafter Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic
Damages Measure of Compensation]. According to Kip Viscusi, the result of allowing recovery for a decedent’s
hedonic loss will be “an unprecedented level of excessive compensation from the standpoint of both deterrence
and insurance.” Id. at 134. Elaborating on this position, he writes:
Greater damages levels that arise from the introduction of hedonic damages as a standard
compensation component in turn will impose higher costs on insurers and defendants in such cases.
These higher costs will boost insurer premiums, raise product prices, lead doctors to undertake
additional defensive medicine efforts, and have other adverse economic consequences. If, of
course, damages were initially set at too low a level, then such ramifications would be the result of
installing a more efficient damages regime. Btu the practical difficulty is that compensation for
hedonic losses will not foster optimal damages levels but will instead make damages inefficiently
high so that the economic repercussions will be inefficient.
Id. at 129; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Policy Challenges of the Heterogeneity of the Value of Statistical Life, 6
FOUNDS. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 99, 100 (2010) (arguing that damages for hedonic losses in tort would
lead to “excessive levels of compensatory damages and would greatly increase damage amounts”). As we will
see in Part I.B, infra, however, Viscusi seemingly argues elsewhere that we should allow recovery for “hedonic
loss” damages—albeit in the form of punitive damages and not compensatory damages.
32. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4.
33. Id. at 553.
34. Id.
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something (or to avoid something).35 But, when we attempt to use this approach
to put a price on an immediate loss of one’s life, it does not help us in the way
that it would in more typical cases. This is because—leaving aside cases of
altruism and other related issues—there is no sum of money that a person would
accept in return for giving up his life in an immediate death. There is no amount
of money that would make a person indifferent between (1) not having one’s life
end in an immediate death and not receiving a monetary payment, and (2) having
one’s life end in an immediate death but receiving a monetary payment. Or, said
differently, there is no amount of money that could make the person whole after
incurring the harm of having his life brought to an immediate end and losing out
on his entire future. The amount required to be paid to the decedent to trade away
his life would therefore be infinite.
But, as Jennifer Arlen (among others) has discussed, do we really want the
tortfeasor who has caused a death to be required to pay every single dollar he
owns (even if it is billions of dollars) to pay for causing the decedent’s hedonic
loss?36 It seems that the answer is “no,” because if this were the law, all sorts of
productive activities and behavior in society could come to a standstill out of
people’s fear that they might negligently cause a death and that they would then
be bankrupted.37 Accordingly, Arlen argues that in determining how to calculate
damages in this area of the law, we must take into account the fact that we are
all potential involuntary sellers of lives and involuntary buyers of lives, and that
we thus must come up with a rule for how to price hedonic loss that reflects the
bilateral nature of the problem, rather than simply coming up with a damages
sum.38 In Part IV.C, I return to Arlen’s point and her arguments;39 suffice it to
say here that it does not seem as though pricing the hedonic loss at an infinite
number of dollars (which in practice would amount to however much wealth the
defendant possesses) is the answer that we want.
Since we want the hedonic loss to be worth neither zero dollars nor an
infinite number of dollars, how are we to come up with a reasonable (and nonarbitrary) amount of dollars that will reflect the hedonic loss to the decedent? In
light of our seeming inability to use WTP/WTA in these cases, it seems that we
must invent some sort of a construct that can sidestep the difficulties confronted
by WTP/WTA in this context and provide us with a dollar sum to attribute to the
lost life. In deciding how to think about these issues, S&P explore regulatory
law’s treatment of the issue of valuing life, and they argue that tort law should
implement a version of the approach that is taken in that domain: the “value of
a statistical life” (VSL).40
35. See generally Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some Clarifications and Puzzles, supra note
12.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

See Arlen, supra note 5, at 1116.
Id. at 1117.
Id. at 1135.
See infra Part IV.C.
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 553–57.
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S&P compare the way in which tort law and regulatory law employ
approaches to the question of valuing life that differ in various ways, and they
discuss the ways in which each domain can improve by adopting some of the
methods employed by the other domain.41 As they say, some of the differences
can be understood because of the different contexts in which regulatory law and
tort law operate (and it is perhaps even good that they differ), but both areas have
huge omissions of different types and are in serious need of improvement.42 S&P
argue that both frameworks can learn a lot from the other, and thus that both
domains are in need of reform to incorporate aspects of the other domain.43 In
this Article, however, I focus merely on tort law’s omissions (namely its failure
to allow recovery for hedonic loss for lost years of life), and on how tort might
be able to learn from how regulatory law handles valuation-of-life issues—thus
leaving aside questions of how regulatory law’s treatment of valuation-of-life
issues might be able to be improved. Further, I focus only on what tort law
should do regarding compensating for hedonic loss of the decedent for his lost
years of life—thus completely leaving out of the discussion the various other
claims included in wrongful death suits (for example, financial support for
family members, consortium, and so on). The exclusive question going forward
will be the question of how to price the hedonic loss to the decedent (for his lost
years of life), such that tort law can provide appropriate incentives and
deterrence for future potential tortfeasors.
Unlike tort law, regulatory law does take the hedonic loss to decedents into
account (and it has been doing so the since the 1980s).44 It does so via sums that
are uniform across people, and which are called “value of a statistical life”
(VSL), and sometimes via sums called “value of statistical life-years” (VSLY).45
Currently, in today’s dollars, the VSL sum is approximately $9 million.46 The
VSL approach works as follows:
VSL infers a price that people put on their own lives based on what people
have paid or accepted in consumption and labor-force decisions—with the
majority of the data coming from labor-force decisions.47 More specifically,
VSL calculates the dollar value of the loss of life to decedents by seeing how
much people (in datasets covering hundreds of thousands of people) are willing
to pay or accept for an additional 1/10,000 risk of death (which studies have
found, in today’s dollars, to be approximately $900).48 Then, we multiply $900
41. Id. at 538–43.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 542–43.
44. Id. at 549.
45. See id. at 551; see, e.g., id. at 538 n.9.
46. Lisa A. Robinson & James K. Hammitt, Valuing Reductions in Fatal Illness Risks: Implications of
Recent Research, 25 HEALTH ECON. 1039 (2016); see also GLOBAL HEALTH PRIORITY-SETTING: BEYOND COSTEFFECTIVENESS 113 (Ole F. Norheim, Exekiel J. Emanuel & Joseph Millum eds., 2020).
47. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 557.
48. See id. at 551; Robinson & Hammitt, supra note 46; see also GLOBAL HEALTH PRIORITY-SETTING:
BEYOND COST-EFFECTIVENESS, supra note 46, at 113.
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by 10,000 to extrapolate to the dollar value of a whole life. The thought is that
if the value of a 1/10,000 chance of death is a certain price, then we can multiply
by that percent chance to see what the value of the whole life is.49
In my view, there are serious concerns with this approach. It is important
to note, though, that in a typical case (that is, a case that does not involve death
or the shortening of life), this maneuver would not be creating a “construct” in
its attempt to value the bad event of which at first there only is a risk. In the
typical case, where the bad event does not involve death or a shortening of a life,
the inferred value is not a construct at all; in such cases it indeed represents the
cost of the bad event occurring, assuming no risk-aversion or time-value-ofmoney issues. For example, if a person is willing to pay $1,000 (R) to avoid a
ten percent risk of a bad event happening the following month (r), then (given
the assumptions I mentioned), we can infer that the harm of the bad event the
following month would be R/r (that is, $10,000). Further, given the same
assumptions, this inference would be sound even in a case of non-economic
damages. Hence, in typical cases we can infer the cost of a bad event from what
one would pay to avoid a given percentage of risk that this event occurs. In such
cases it would be equivalent in terms of deterrence, as S&P say, to either have a
tortfeasor pay R to all whom the risk is imposed on, or to pay R/r (that is, the
cost of the bad event) but to only those who actually have the bad event happen
to them.50 As S&P say, these two options (the ex ante option and the ex post
option) would also be equivalent not only from a deterrence perspective, but also
from the perspective of compensation for plaintiffs.51
According to S&P, this VSL framework enables us in cases involving loss
of life to create a construct that takes, as inputs, the amounts people value certain
low risks of death, and then provides us with an output that is the dollar value to
a person of his whole life.52 This, of course, is a mere construct, because if asked
how much money one would accept for having one’s life end immediately, there
is no sum that one would accept. But that is precisely why we are in search for
a construct—because seemingly without one we are unable to put a dollar sum
on losing the entire remainder of one’s life.
VSL as a system has various limitations and S&P acknowledge many of
these (despite espousing VSL as a system that tort law should use—albeit with
some tweaks).53 I discuss some of these limitations below. All of the following
limitations, however, are not necessarily objections that render the theory
unworkable; rather they are various problems that could probably be addressed
by tweaking the system or perhaps simply recognizing that the VSL approach
inherently lacks some accuracy. The following limitations, for the most part, do

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 557.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 556–57.
Id. at 557.
Id.
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not really shake the core of the VSL approach. This seems to be why, despite
these issues, S&P (and many other authors, too) still endorse the VSL
framework.
Before mentioning the main and common objections to VSL, I first
mention an objection to VSL and a suggestion for a tweaking of it that S&P
themselves raise: S&P argue that tort law should not use a uniform VSL, but it
should instead tailor to more specifics of a person.54 This individuation, they
say, could happen in a few ways. It could be more tailored to age and wealth and
also other factors that typically might make people’s willingness to pay to avoid
risks very different across groups.55 (There is evidence, unsurprisingly, that age
and wealth are among the factors that affect how much one’s personalized VSL
would be.56)
Leaving aside for the moment this specific suggestion offered by S&P,
what follows are some of the many common problems, limitations, and
objections that are raised against VSL (and, typically, conceded by proponents
of VSL to afflict VSL). Many of these objections are rooted in behavioral
economics.
First off, the limitations that are not directly rooted in behavioral
economics:
There is a question of whether the studies about choices between jobs in
the work force based on salary and risk of death truly establish what they purport
to establish. There can be questions of the methodology of these studies and
whether they indeed provide plausible support for their results. One might think
that they do not actually even support the conclusions about people being willing
to pay $900 to avoid an increase of risk of death by 1/10,000. For one, it is
unclear whether we can accurately determine that the riskier job increases risk
of death by precisely 1/10,000.57 Second, it is not always clear that people at all
know the risks of the different options that they are confronting and purportedly
weighing (much less, that they know these risks with accuracy and precision).58
Third, it is not always clear how much of a choice a person in the labor-force
has when confronted with particular job conditions, or, even if there is some
choice, how much freedom the person feels that they have in this choice—in
light of various constraints in their life.59 Also, there might be various other risks
of death that are not being taken into account but which are part of the equation
(for example, higher risks of death associated with having a lower-paying job

54. Id. at 566–68.
55. Id. at 567.
56. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market
Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 36, 50–51 (2003); Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years,
and Willingness to Pay, supra note 12, at 231–34; Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Age Variations in Workers’
Value of Statistical Life 42 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 10199, 2003).
57. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 551, 563–64.
58. See id. at 564.
59. Id. at 565.
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and thus not being able to afford certain consumption items, medical services,
or luxuries that might bring about countervailing lowered chances of death).
Now, as for a few of the many limitations more rooted in behavioral
economics:
For one, people apparently have different assessments (in terms of what
they would pay to avoid an increase in risk of death by 1/10,000) for different
levels of baseline risk that they have of death, and what percent risk one would
be moving to, so extrapolation does not always give the same numbers (holding
steady that the amount of risk is increased by 1/10,000). The sum we get is
largely a function of which baseline percent risk we use, because the dollar sum
is very different at different points of baseline risk. The curve is non-linear. As
a result, it seems arbitrary which percent to use to extrapolate from.60
Additionally, even if the curve were linear and the baseline risk level not
arbitrary,61 there still would be a key additional difficulty related to the calculus.
Human beings are notorious for being bad at making rational decisions in the
context of extremely low probabilities.62 Be it over-valuing or under-valuing
these probabilities (we have been found to exhibit each of these types of
mistakes in different contexts), we are bad at using these numbers.63 As a result,
it really is not clear whether we should put any stock at all in the precise sums
people are willing to pay or accept as a result of these low risks. Further, since
these dollar sums to avoid the 1/10,000 risk (for example, $900) are then
multiplied by 10,000 to get the VSL, the VSL could be far off due to a small
variance in the dollar sum for accepting the 1/10,000 risk. Thus, when it really
might have been somewhat arbitrary and due to non-rational processes that one
decides to pay $100 versus $1,000 to avoid the tiny risk, such irrelevant
differences would result in the difference between a VSL of $1 million and one
of $10 million. This huge difference would be arbitrary and not reflect what we
are thinking and hoping that it reflects.64
Despite all of these limitations of the VSL approach (and the foregoing
only describes some of the limitations), S&P still believe that a version of VSL
should be used to put a dollar sum on the hedonic loss incurred by decedents for
their lost years of life in wrongful death suits.65 In their view, these concerns

60. See id. at 557.
61. And even if we assume that we can determine that the riskier job increases the risk of death by precisely
1/10,000, which, as I’ve stated, there could be doubts about.
62. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J.
BUS. S251, S272–73 (1986).
63. See id. at S274–75.
64. An additional issue involves figuring out details about the behavioral economics associated with the
differences between WTP and WTA sums. There is reason to think that our sums differ depending on whether
one confronts decisions in a WTP or WTA context, and if the sums indeed are different, there’s then a question
of which framework to use. For an overview of this literature, see Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and
Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227 (2002). Further, there are a number of additional concerns for the VSL
approach arising out of behavioral economics—even beyond those discussed here.
65. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 587–90.
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with VSL are merely fine-tuning types of concerns, and not concerns that shake
the core of the VSL approach.66 Further, as I describe below, a large number of
others agree with S&P that VSL is indeed the approach that should be used for
hedonic loss in wrongful death suits in tort, and that even if some tweaks are
necessary, VSL indeed is the correct general approach to use.67
I agree with these authors that the various limitations discussed above
probably do not shake the very core of the VSL approach. I disagree, however,
with the view that VSL is the correct general approach. To the contrary, I argue
that it is mistaken altogether—and for reasons wholly separate from the “finetuning” issues that indeed plague the VSL approach. In the following Parts, I
explain why the VSL approach is misguided, and propose an alternative. Before
doing so, however, I first provide some additional background about approaches
that authors have taken to the question of how to assign a dollar figure to a
decedent’s hedonic loss—both outside of the VSL framework and within the
VSL framework.
C. CANVASING OTHER VSL AND NON-VSL APPROACHES
This Subpart provides some additional background regarding the
approaches that have been taken to the question of how to assign a dollar figure
to a decedent’s hedonic loss—both outside of the VSL framework and within
the VSL framework. The purpose of this discussion is threefold. First, I aim
simply to describe what has been said in the literature on the topic of hedonicloss damages, both before and after 2005. Second, I aim to show both that the
VSL approach is the dominant way of thinking about how to assign a dollar sum
to hedonic loss, and that, given the existing alternatives, this is for good reason.
The VSL approach is indeed the best proposal that we currently have for how to
assign a dollar sum to hedonic loss. It is better than the other accounts that have
been articulated. Third, showing that (1) the positive proposal presented here is
novel and (2) VSL is not only dominant but also the best of all currently available
proposals, paves the way for this Article’s main argument. After all, if VSL is
better than existing alternatives, I need only show that the positive proposal of
this Article is better than VSL to establish that it is the best available approach.
1. Within the VSL Approach
I first consider examples of authors espousing the VSL approach to
assigning a dollar sum to a decedent’s hedonic loss.
First, Sunstein himself has continued to advocate this general approach,
and, in the years since Dollars and Death, he has written a number of articles
aimed at fine-tuning and improving the VSL approach. In Valuing Life: A Plea
for Disaggregation, he argued that a uniform VSL measure is not what we

66. Id.
67. See infra Part I.C.
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should use, but rather that we should use a measure that is more individuated in
various ways.68 According to him, a uniform figure to measure the value of a
statistical life is a serious mistake: “The very theory that underlies [VSL] calls
for far more individuation of the relevant values. According to that theory, VSL
should vary across risk. More controversially, VSL should vary across
individuals—even or especially if the result would be to produce a lower number
for some people than others.”69 Additionally, one of the main specific ways in
which Sunstein thinks that there should be greater individuation is that the
damages sum for hedonic loss should vary based on how many years of life it is
expected that the decedent has lost.70 The thought is that someone who loses
more years of life is incurring a more substantial loss than someone who loses
fewer years. Thus, all else equal, individuation should occur along the dimension
of the decedent’s age. Sunstein thus argues that instead of using VSL (value of
a statistical life), we should use VSLY (“value of statistical life-years”).71
According to Sunstein, “the hard question involves not whether to undertake this
shift, but how to monetize life-years.”72 Sunstein has also addressed a number
of other important and interesting questions that arise within the general VSL
framework.73
Many other authors have also signed on to the VSL approach for assigning
a dollar sum to damages for a decedent’s hedonic loss. These authors typically
argue for a particular version of VSL or for particular tweaks to the way in which
it would be used. For instance, in Community Versus Market Values of Life,74
Robert Cooter and David DePianto explore the differences between
“community” and “market” VSL. According to them, the VSL framework can
derive dollar sums by extrapolating from dollars spent by individuals in their
consumption decisions and labor-force decisions reflecting choices regarding
risks of death, and it can also carry out these extrapolations by focusing on how
“[c]ommunities balance risk and cost through social norms of precaution, which
prescribe how much risk people may impose on others and on themselves. For
example, social norms dictate that bicyclists should wear helmets and
automobile passengers should wear seat belts.”75 According to Cooter and
DePianto, there are considerable differences between the average dollar values
for VSL derived in the “individual” (“market”) context and those derived in the
“community” context; they argue we ought to endorse the use of community
VSLs in tort.76
68. Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, supra note 12, at 404–05.
69. Id. at 385.
70. Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, supra note 12, at 208–09, 240–41.
71. Id. at 206.
72. Id. at 205.
73. See, e.g., Sunstein, The Value of a Statistical Life: Some Clarifications and Puzzles, supra note 12, at
237; SUNSTEIN, supra note 12, at 5.
74. Cooter & DePianto, supra note 12, at 713–14.
75. Id. at 713.
76. Id. at 755–58.
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Other examples of prominent authors in the VSL camp are A. Mitchell
Polinsky and Steven Shavell. According to them, compensatory damages in
wrongful death cases should equal the VSL sum.77
Also in the camp of proponents of VSL in the context of hedonic-loss
damages are Joni Hersch and Kip Viscusi.78 The account that they offer is
somewhat different from those discussed so far here, however, because, while
these other accounts have involved the VSL sum being a component of the
compensatory damages sum, Hersch and Viscusi argue that the VSL sum should
be used in order to determine the punitive damages sum.79 According to them,
the VSL sum should be used to set the total damages amount needed for
deterrence in wrongful death cases; however, they argue that the compensatory
sum should be kept as is, and that the punitive damages sum should be altered
to make the total damages sum equal the VSL sum.80 They write:
[We] propose[] the following punitive damages formula for wrongful
death cases: the total value of punitive damages plus compensatory damages
should equal the VSL. To achieve this equality, there should be no change in
current practices regarding the value of compensatory damages. Rather, the
entire adjustment should be made to punitive damages, which should be set to
equal the VSL minus the value of compensatory damages. [We] elaborate[]
on this proposal, indicating how it can be modified to account for unusually
large economic losses and a low probability of detection.81

According to Hersch and Viscusi, it would be misguided for the full VSL
sum to represent compensatory damages, because this would “undermine[] the
current function of compensatory damages,”82 which, they argue, is
compensation and insurance.83 Despite the differences between Hersch and
Viscusi’s account and the other VSL accounts mentioned so far, however,
Hersch and Viscusi are nevertheless indeed proponents of the VSL account as
well.
As these examples illustrate, many prominent authors defend various
versions of VSL; other versions of VSL exist as well.

77. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 12, at 889–91, 941–42 (arguing that, in wrongful death cases,
compensatory damages should equal the VSL, regardless of whether the damages measure also includes punitive
damages).
78. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 12, at 229.
79. Id. at 230–31.
80. Id. at 231.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 229.
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2. Non-VSL Approaches to Determining Damages Sums for a
Decedent’s Hedonic Loss
While some authors have argued that there should not be compensation at
all for a decedent’s hedonic loss,84 not all authors who argue that there should
be compensation for a decedent’s hedonic loss are proponents of the VSL
approach. I note here a few such examples.
First, Andrew Jay McClurg argued that we should provide damages for a
decedent’s hedonic loss even before S&P’s article.85 According to him, any
attempt to put a dollar sum on the lost life is problematic, and the best solution
is simply for legislatures to determine an arbitrary but uniform sum.86
Frank Cross and Charles Silver similarly argue for the adoption of a
“presumptive minimum award” in wrongful death cases, to correct for undercompensation and associated under-deterrence.87 Like McClurg, they espouse
the use of an arbitrary sum to be assigned to a decedent’s hedonic loss.88
While these authors are right to argue that there should be damages
recoverable for a decedent’s hedonic loss, that it is difficult to come up with a
principled account of what the appropriate damages sum should be, and that an
arbitrary sum would be better than no damages sum, the VSL approach does
better than the “arbitrary sum” approach. This is because VSL at least is
attempting to provide a principled basis for the particular damages sum to be
assigned to the decedent’s hedonic loss. Even if one thinks (as I do) that the VSL
approach is mistaken, it still, at the very worst, is on a par with the “arbitrary
sum” approach, because at the very worst, VSL would turn out to be an
“arbitrary sum.” VSL is either a superior approach or it itself is an arbitrary sum.
Thus, while the McClurg and Cross and Silver points are not bad, we can do
better (be it with the VSL approach or with something else).
Some other non-VSL approaches have been taken as well, but, as with the
McClurg and Cross and Silver approaches, they do not seem to provide ways to
assign a non-arbitrary damages sum to a decedent’s hedonic loss.89
3. Summary Regarding VSL and Non-VSL Approaches to Determining
Damages Sums for a Decedent’s Hedonic Loss
In sum, the VSL approach is currently the dominant way of thinking about
how tort law should assign a dollar sum to a decedent’s hedonic loss. Other

84. See, e.g., Viscusi, The Flawed Hedonic Damages Measure of Compensation, supra note 31, at 126,
130–31.
85. Andrew J. McClurg, It’s a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases,
66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57, 60–61 (1990).
86. Id. at 110.
87. Frank Cross & Charles Silver, In Texas, Life Is Cheap, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1873, 1921–22 (2006).
88. Id.
89. Though not attempting to put a dollar sum on hedonic loss, for a discussion of the topic, see, for
example, Gregory C. Keating, Irreparable Injury and Extraordinary Precaution: The Safety and Feasibility
Norms in American Accident Law, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 1 (2003).
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approaches exist (for example, those of McClurg and Cross and Silver), but, as
I have argued, it seems that they are not promising. Further, the VSL approach,
at the very worst, is on a par with these other approaches. The VSL approach is
a valiant attempt to do better than the accounts that espouse the use of an
arbitrary damages sum, and in some ways it indeed is better. VSL is a good step
forward because, at the very least, it is trying to provide a non-arbitrary way of
assigning a damages sum to the hedonic loss. Thus, there seems to be good
reason for the VSL approach being the dominant approach; it is the most
promising currently available approach. Thus, in the remainder of this Article I
focus on the VSL approach rather than on any of the other accounts. As I will
show, however, even though VSL is a better approach than the others that
currently exist, it too has serious flaws. As I will show, we not only can do better
than the non-VSL accounts, but we can also do better than the VSL account.
4. Other Considerations Regarding Whether We Want, and If So
Whether Monetary Damages Can Effectuate, “Full Compensation”
Before continuing, I briefly flag considerations and strategies raised by two
other authors, which will be returned to later in this Article. These
considerations, raised by Jennifer Arlen and Mark Geistfeld, both pertain not to
the question of whether VSL is the appropriate measure for determining full
compensation, but, rather, to broader questions regarding the notion of full
compensation itself: questions of whether (1) full compensation is something we
even want (that is, whether we should instead have less than full compensation);
and (2) whether compensatory damages are capable of being fully
compensatory, and, if not, how we can remedy this shortfall to provide full
compensation.
First, Arlen’s points about full compensation: Arlen argues that while
damages should be recoverable for the hedonic loss of the decedent, we would
not want a rule that provides full compensation for a decedent’s hedonic loss.90
Instead, she argues that we would prefer to live in a society where there is less
than full compensation for hedonic loss because the prospect of having to be an
involuntary payer of full compensation for someone else’s life would be too
burdensome, and this is not something that we would want.91 I flag Arlen’s
approach here, but I will consider her arguments separately, in Part IV.C.
Next, Geistfeld’s different point about full compensation: According to
him, in cases of irreparable harm (of which death is one example), there is a
“compensatory shortfall”—that is, compensatory damages do not fully or
sufficiently compensate.92 As a result, in order to bring about greater
90. See Arlen, supra note 5, at 1127–28, 1135–36; see also Jennifer H. Arlen, Reconsidering Efficient Tort
Rules for Personal Injury: The Case of Single Activity Accidents, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41, 86–87 (1990).
91. Arlen, supra note 90, at 86–87.
92. See Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 142; see also Mark A. Geistfeld, The Tort Entitlement to Physical
Security as the Distributive Basis for Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulations, 15 THEORETICAL INQ. L.
387, 407 (2014) [hereinafter Geistfeld, The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security]; Mark Geistfeld, Placing a

1532

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 72:1511

compensation and more optimal incentives, we should pursue other avenues—
such as increasing the amount of expenditure on care that we require of potential
tortfeasors in cases that would result in irreparable harm.93 This expenditure of
wealth by potential tortfeasors, which would redound to the benefit of potential
plaintiffs, would, according to Geistfeld, help minimize the “compensatory
shortfall.”94 Further, and relatedly, Geistfeld argues that, as a result of this
“compensatory shortfall,” punitive damages play an instrumental role in
protecting potential plaintiffs’ security and bodily integrity in cases of
irreparable harms, and thus punitive damages constitute a crucial component of
our tort system.95
In addition to these broader questions raised about full compensation by
Arlen and Geistfeld, recall also that despite being proponents of the VSL
account, Hersch and Viscusi also articulated views regarding broader questions
about the notion of full compensation.96 According to them, hedonic loss is not
something that should be a component of full compensation, and they think that
we would want recovery in wrongful death suits to be equal to the VSL sum,
much of which would fall in the category of punitive damages.97 Thus, according
to them, the appropriate damages measure for wrongful death would be a sum
that is in excess of full compensation.98
In sum, in the context of wrongful death, Arlen argues that we should have
a damages sum that is less than full compensation, Hersch and Viscusi argue
that we should have a damages sum that is more than full compensation, and
Geistfeld argues that we should have full compensation, but that a damages sum,
alone, will not enable us to bring about full compensation, and thus we must
heighten the amount of care we require of potential tortfeasors so as to lessen
the compensatory shortfall.
As will become clear in this Article, I think that all of these authors are
mistaken. I will show that in the wrongful death context, fully compensatory
damages, when understood in the correct way,99 (1) contra Arlen, are not too
high of a damages sum, (2) contra Hersch and Viscusi, are not too low of a
damages sum, and (3) contra Geistfeld, do not give rise to a “compensatory
shortfall” that requires us to pursue other avenues to supplement damages to get

Price on Pain and Suffering: A Method for Helping Juries Determine Tort Damages for Nonmonetary Injuries,
83 CALIF. L. REV. 773, 796–803 (1995) (arguing against the reduction of pain-and-suffering damages); Mark
Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with the Principle That Safety Matters More than Money, 76
N.Y.U. L. REV. 114, 141–42 (2001).
93. Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 142; Geistfeld, The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security, supra note 92, at
407.
94. See Geistfeld, The Tort Entitlement to Physical Security, supra note 92, at 407.
95. Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 145–46.
96. Hersch & Viscusi, supra note 12.
97. Id. at 231.
98. Id. at 232.
99. For an explanation of how to understand compensatory damages in the wrongful death context in the
right way, see infra Part II.B.
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closer to providing full compensation. Accordingly, in my view, it also is not
the case that the wrongful death context (or, more generally, the irreparable harm
context) uniquely100 requires punitive damages.101
***
With these additional considerations in mind, I now return to a discussion
of VSL. As I have shown, the VSL approach is the dominant approach to
thinking about how tort law should assign a dollar sum to a decedent’s hedonic
loss. In what follows, I explain why, in my view, the VSL approach to pricing
hedonic loss is not the approach we should use.

II. MY CONCERNS WITH THE VSL APPROACH
A. INITIAL INTUITIVE CONCERNS
The limitations of VSL discussed in Part I.B arguably do not strike the very
core of the VSL approach. In other words, one might think that these issues do
not cast doubt on the use of VSL but, rather, that they just point to various ways
in which we need to tweak or fine-tune VSL. I think that this might be right. I
do, however, also think that, especially when all of these limitations are taken as
a whole, the fine-tuning concerns discussed above might indeed be significant
enough that there is reason to look for something new. I also think, however,
that even if they are not terrible problems for VSL in and of themselves, they
might be symptomatic of a more significant problem with the VSL approach:
the arbitrariness of it—in the sense that what we are measuring is not really what
we are after. It seems that there is a disconnect between what we are measuring
and what we are saying that the output is: the dollar value of the 100% chance
of death. Yes, one could say that by definition there is a gap, because the whole
point is that we are trying to make a construct because we have a gap that we are

100. I’m not suggesting that there aren’t reasons for there to be punitive damages in the wrongful death
context. Indeed, punitive damages might be appropriate in the wrongful death context for the typical reasons
that punitive damages might be appropriate (for example, the need for extra deterrence because of a non-100%
detection rate, expressing moral disapproval and blame, and the like). Instead, my point is that the context of
wrongful death (and of irreparable harm, more generally) does not uniquely require punitive damages, despite
the arguments of Hersch and Viscusi and of Geistfeld to the contrary.
101. Contra Geistfeld, in my view, compensatory damages can indeed avoid a compensatory shortfall. Even
though they cannot compensate the dead person himself, punitive damages cannot either, and whether the
decedent himself can be compensated is not the only workable litmus test for whether there is a compensatory
shortfall. Additionally, appropriately priced compensatory damages can indeed bring about the optimal
incentives—inducing a sufficient expenditure on care by the potential tortfeasor. Having compensatory damages
be correctly priced, indeed, would bring about the optimal expenditure on care by the potential tortfeasor, and
bringing about the optimal expenditure on care is what Geistfeld thinks is needed to supplement compensatory
damages. In my view, however, this is brought about by having correctly priced compensatory damages. As
stated in note 100, supra, however, it could be that the typical rationales for punitive damages, if applicable to a
particular case of wrongful death (or, more generally, irreparable harm) could make it appropriate for there to
also be punitive damages. This, however, would not be for reasons unique to wrongful death (or, more generally,
irreparable harm).
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trying to bridge. But it seems to me that we must be able to do better than this.
The system seems too arbitrary.
What is counterintuitive about the problem that we are trying to solve (that
is, what dollar sum to attribute to the decedent’s hedonic loss) is that people
would not actually view the extrapolated sum (that is, $9 million) as a sum that
they would accept for the occurrence of the future bad event. This is unlike the
case of extrapolation that we do in a typical case where the bad event is
something other than death. As discussed earlier, in that case we indeed would
view the extrapolated dollar value as the value one attributes to the future bad
event; there, we would be indifferent between the bad event occurring but being
compensated for it, and the bad event not occurring (and thus also not being paid
any compensation). Not so in the death case. We would prefer to not die than to
die and have the tortfeasor pay $9 million. This all, of course, is just restating
the nature of the task that confronts us here, however. Any dollar sum that we
attribute to the hedonic loss will suffer from this objection. Thus, these
comments in and of themselves do not show that the VSL account is afflicted by
a problem that would not also plague any other account. These comments do
hint at something, though: the seeming arbitrariness of VSL. This arbitrariness
on its own would not itself be a sufficient reason to reject the VSL approach,
though, if all possible accounts in this domain would also suffer from the
arbitrariness concern. It might just be that some arbitrariness in setting the dollar
sum is a necessary feature of this problem. If, however, I can show that another
approach does not suffer from arbitrariness, then that would be a reason to prefer
the other approach to the VSL approach.102
B. TWO WAYS OF SEEING THAT VSL IS CARRYING OUT THE HAPPINESS-TOMONEY TRANSLATION AT THE WRONG JUNCTURE
Having stated that, intuitively, something seems a bit off and a bit
unsatisfying about the VSL approach, I now explain more concretely what I take
to be the problem with the VSL approach.
If we are to provide a monetary remedy for the loss of happiness to the
decedent (as I agree we should, so as to bring about optimal deterrence), we will
at some juncture need to translate the lost happiness into a monetary sum. The
VSL approach does this, but I think that it does so at the wrong juncture in the
analysis—namely on the decedent’s utility curve. The following discussions
will: (1) explain further what I mean by this claim; and (2) explain why I think
I am right to think that VSL’s translation from happiness to money is occurring
in the wrong place. I then offer an alternative approach—which carries out the
happiness-to-money translation on the tortfeasor’s utility curve rather than on

102. Importantly, however, S&P do not think that the VSL approach is arbitrary. They think that it is a
principled approach to the topic and that there is good reason to use this as a way to quantify the dollar sum to
be attributed to the lost life. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 587–92.
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the decedent’s—and I argue that it is not afflicted by the problems plaguing the
VSL approach.103
In what follows, I provide two separate arguments to show that the VSL
approach is mistaken to carry out the happiness-to-money translation on the
decedent’s utility curve. First, I show that the phrase “the monetary loss to the
decedent” (like its closely related variants) has no meaning and therefore cannot
be the basis for a non-arbitrary answer to the question at hand. Second, I argue
that the decedent’s wealth is irrelevant to the determination of damages for
hedonic loss. Using the decedent’s wealth for this calculation is problematic
from both the backward-looking and the forward-looking perspectives. As will
become clear, this second point also lays the groundwork for the positive
proposal that I will present in Part III.
1. Point 1: The Term “The Monetary Amount of the Loss to the
Decedent” and Its Variants Lack Meaning
I have already stated that it does not make sense to speak about the amount
of money to attribute to the loss to the decedent. And the proponent of VSL
might likely agree that it sounds a bit odd, since people would not be indifferent
between dying and being compensated or not dying and not being compensated.
Although this was more a statement of the problem that VSL seeks to solve than
a problem with the VSL approach as an attempt to solve it, it does point us to a
problem with VSL.
The problem with VSL is not (1) that the person would not be indifferent
between (a) death and compensation, and (b) no death and no compensation; or
(2) that the decedent cannot be made whole with the money because he is dead,
although both of these statements are true and are what make our topic a tricky
one. Rather, the problem is that it is not even clear that “the monetary amount of
the loss to the decedent” has a meaning or makes any sense. Contrast this,
however, with a different notion: “the happiness amount of the loss.” The
decedent, being dead, of course cannot be compensated either for his loss in
happiness or his loss in money, but the notion in the context of happiness makes
sense in a way that the monetary version does not. We can indeed make sense
of the idea that the decedent, as a result of his death, incurred a loss of happiness.
He did not, however, incur a loss of money. Thus, the point here is that the phrase
“the monetary amount of the loss to the decedent” simply does not have a
meaning. It does not make sense to ask how much of a monetary loss was
brought about to the decedent by losing out on the years of life that he would
have had in his future. There simply is no such monetary loss.
Thus, it seems that part of the problem with the VSL approach is that it
attempts to put a dollar sum on a concept that has no referent. The seeming
103. For a discussion of various issues regarding the relevance of defendants’ wealth and whether it should
be taken into account in determining either the level of due care or the compensatory damage award, see Jennifer
H. Arlen, Should Defendants’ Wealth Matter?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 413 (1992).
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arbitrariness and difficulty in finding a satisfying and plausible answer to the
question of how much that sum should be thus likely is due to a difficulty in
even articulating the question itself.
To attempt to articulate these same points but from a slightly different
angle, there is another (related) way of showing that the VSL approach is
carrying out the happiness-to-money translation at the wrong juncture (and thus
the following is another way of pointing to the meaninglessness of “the monetary
amount of the loss to the decedent”): The decedent lacks a utility curve. He has
no utility function—in other words, he has no function illustrating the amounts
of happiness that various amounts of money provide him with. Thus, there is no
function for him anymore that provides a means to translate monetary sums into
happiness sums (or which provides us with insight about how to perform that
translation). And using the utility curve from when he was alive seems arbitrary
at best.104 Thus, as a result (and to preview the solution I offer below, in Part
III), we will need to use someone else’s utility curve.
a. Some Possible Objections (and Responses to the Objections)
Objection Number 1. One might respond to me as follows, arguing that
indeed the decedent did incur a loss of money: Perhaps, one might say, the
decedent has a monetary loss in the sense that he would have accepted money in
a VSL-type sense in the labor force to incur this risk of death, and, thus, his
failure to get paid that amount of money for incurring the risk is a way in which
he was not compensated and in which he incurred a loss. In other words, perhaps
it would have been a fair deal for him if he had received the $900 and then
incurred the risk of death, and then had had the death indeed happen. But he did
not get paid the $900, so he thus had a monetary loss.
I offer two points in response to this point: First, even if the general point
just articulated is correct in broad strokes, it still does not give us the result that
the VSL approach purports to give us. The VSL approach states that the dollar
value of the loss to attribute to the death is $9 million, but the foregoing thought
experiment shows, at best, that the decedent’s loss is equal to $900, and not $9
million. Second, the argument does not even follow with respect to the $900,
because whether or not the death in fact came to fruition for this decedent is a
question orthogonal to whether or not he was paid. It might very well be that he
was already paid $900. If so, then even on this theory he would not be owed
anything. Further, conversely, if the decedent was exposed to the risk for which
he should be paid $900, then he should have been paid $900 regardless of
whether the risk materialized into an actual death for him. Accordingly, the $900
is not in any sense the monetary loss to the decedent that is brought about by his
death. This is a second way in which the argument I am responding to here is
seemingly not a particularly strong one.
104. See Objection Number 3, below, for further discussion of whether using the utility function from when
the decedent was alive would be arbitrary.
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Objection Number 2. Perhaps the VSL proponent could respond that we
need not refer to the term, “the amount of monetary loss to the decedent,” and
that we instead could simply refer to the monetary sum as the amount that would
bring about the correct incentives for future tortfeasors. Thus, the VSL
proponent might say that I am attacking a straw man, and that he is simply trying
to find the correct monetary amount for the damages sum. He can say that he
can just talk about this in more neutral terms, without changing the substance of
what is being said, and he thus would be able to be immune to the points I make
here, which he might call “definitional.”
But it does not seem as though this strategy would work, because it likely
turns out to be a circular argumentative maneuver. This is because, while we
could just refer to the monetary sum that would bring about the correct
incentives for future tortfeasors, it seems that in trying to cash out what that
amount should be, we would need to say “the amount by which the decedent
was harmed”—or something along these lines. And when we try to say
something like that, it seems that we then run into the very problems that we
were trying to avoid: the problem of being clear about what we even mean by
that phrase, and the seeming difficulty of providing an understanding of that
phrase that makes sense. Thus, it seems that the VSL proponent’s attempted
response does not get him off the hook.
Thus, to reiterate what I stated above, it seems that part of the problem with
the VSL approach is that it attempts to put a dollar sum on a concept that has no
referent (and thus does not even make sense), and the seeming arbitrariness and
difficulty in finding a satisfying and plausible answer to the question of how
much that sum should be might be due to a difficulty in even articulating the
question itself.
Objection Number 3. In response to my claim that it would be “arbitrary at
best” to use the utility function that the decedent had when he was alive, one
might deny this, instead arguing that using the utility function from when the
decedent was alive would not be arbitrary at all, and that this would indeed be a
reasonable option. Further, one possible example of how one might say we could
use the decedent’s utility curve to determine a damages sum is the following:
Suppose that, using one of the “happiness-aggregation functions” that I
introduce in Part III, we have a metric for determining the overall amount of
happiness experienced in a particular life. Perhaps the damages sum (which uses
the decedent’s utility function) could be the sum of money, which, if,
counterfactually, had been distributed throughout the years of the shortened life,
would have resulted in a lifetime that would have contained the same amount of
happiness as the lifetime without the premature death (and thus without any
compensation). Or, said differently, suppose that the damages sum is the sum of
money that a person would accept at the outset of his life (or if choosing between
possible lives for oneself before one is born) in order to be indifferent between
the shorter life and the longer life.
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While this is indeed a way in which we could come up with a damages
sum, it still does not seem to avoid the concerns that I have been raising. It is
true that it is not completely arbitrary—after all, the strategy I just laid out does
follow a formula for determining how to arrive at the appropriate sum—but the
VSL approach follows a formula as well, and I have argued that it is arbitrary in
a relevant way. The way in which VSL and the strategy I just laid out are
arbitrary is that they still do not capture what the loss really is to the decedent,
yet they purport to be doing so. While it indeed might be true that the sum in the
strategy I just laid out could be what makes a person indifferent between the two
possible lives from the start, it still does not seem to speak to how much the
decedent is harmed by the death.105
b. Summary Regarding Point 1
Taking stock: The loss to the decedent can only be quantified in terms of
happiness and not in terms of money. Thus, it just does not make sense to
quantify the loss to the decedent in monetary terms; the loss to the decedent is
not a monetary loss—it is a happiness loss. We cannot translate the loss of
happiness to a loss of money on his utility curve.
This does not, however, mean that money cannot be affixed to that hedonic
sum. (After all, the whole purpose of this Article—and, more generally, the
debate about hedonic-loss damages—is to figure out how to ultimately fix a
monetary sum to this happiness sum, so if it were not ever possible, then this
inquiry would be a failure.) It just means that at this juncture in the analysis there
105. I here offer an additional objection and response:
Objection Number 4. Somewhat related to Objection Number 3, suppose one argues as follows: What
VSL really is is a way of approaching the question of how a person trades off having additional money during
the years he lives versus having additional years of life. The VSL approach takes as inputs the trades between
money and an increase of chance of immediate death by 1/10,000 (which thus amounts to an expected life
expectancy of 9,999/10,000 of the length of what he would otherwise have expected). Similarly, one could ask
a person how much he would have to be paid to give up a certain loss of 1/10,000 of his remaining life
expectancy. Or, similarly, one might ask how much he would have to be paid to give up a certain loss of one
year of life. Thus, there seems to be nothing wrong with there being evidence (obtained either by asking
hypothetical questions or by observing decisions that are made) that shows what dollar sum a person would put
on, say, a year of his life. Perhaps, one might say, even if it does not follow that extrapolating from the dollar
sum one would accept for one year of life, and multiplying by, say, twenty (if one has twenty years of life left)
would constitute the loss to the decedent who loses out on his last twenty years of life, perhaps this is the best
we can do.
If one recognizes the acknowledged limitations of this (that is, that it does not actually capture the loss
to the decedent and is, at best, “the best we can do”), then I do not disagree. And, as I will explain in Part III, I
agree that data about how people trade off dollars for years of their life is indeed data that we can and should
use, and I employ a version of this in my positive proposal. I, however, will use this type of data for comparisons
between dollars and portions of a person’s life that do not constitute the entire remainder of his life. When this
data is used to put a dollar sum on a loss that is incurred by a decedent by a premature death (that is, when the
dollar sum is meant to represent the dollar value of a portion of a person’s life that constitutes the entire
remainder of his life), then I think that a mistake is being made. (If, however, one acknowledges the limitations
I raise and qualifies this maneuver by saying it’s just “the best we can do,” then I wouldn’t object to this as at
least a reasonable attempt to make the best of a difficult problem—although, as I will argue in this Article, it
does not turn out to be even “the best we can do.”).
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is no grounds for picking any particular sum and for referring to the decedent’s
loss in monetary terms. At this point, monetary sums could be affixed to the
happiness loss, but the choice of dollar sum would be arbitrary. His loss must,
at least at this juncture of the analysis, remain in happiness terms.
2. Point 2: The Decedent’s Wealth Is Irrelevant for Determining the
Damages Sum—Both for Backward-Looking and Forward-Looking
Accounts of Tort Law
There is a second way in which we can see that the VSL account is carrying
out the translation from happiness to money at the wrong juncture. Further, it is
this second way that is the most important one for my purposes. This is because
it will show more clearly what the precise problem with the location of VSL’s
carrying out the translation is, and, as a result, will directly lead into my positive
proposal for an alternative to VSL (which will offer an alternative location for
the happiness-to-money translation to be carried out).
The VSL approach derives the value of a statistical life by seeing what
people pay to avoid risks of death. In regulatory law, it simply comes up with
one non-individuated VSL sum (for example, approximately $9 million in
today’s dollars) by averaging across all people in a population (or, rather, the
sample size of the population that was used for data in any particular study).106
The regulatory law domain thus makes no attempt to individuate. As S&P say,
and I agree, a good feature of tort law is that it typically tries to individuate
remedies to a particular case and its parties.107 Thus, if tort law were to provide
damages for hedonic loss, it seems that it should individuate in this domain, just
as in the other domains that tort encounters, and provide an individuated VSL,
specific to the particular case. In Part IV.B, below, I explore whether we indeed
would want individuation for hedonic loss, and I explore some related issues.108
For now, however, I simply assume that, as with other areas of tort law, we want
the remedies in the context of hedonic loss to be individuated and tailored to the
parties.
The way the VSL approach derives the value of the statistical life, of
course, is by seeing what a person pays or would pay to avoid a risk of death and
then by extrapolating to arrive at a dollar sum for the entire life. What this means
is that the dollar sum to be affixed to a particular decedent’s life will be a
function of many things, but, most notably here, it will be drastically affected by
the wealth of the decedent. How much money one has will play a huge role in
determining how much one would be willing to pay (or accept) to avoid (or
incur) a risk of death.109 At one extreme, someone who is very poor will barely
be willing to spend anything (and perhaps he will not be willing to spend
106.
107.
108.
109.

Posner & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 538.
Id. at 540.
See infra Part IV.B.
Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, supra note 12, at 229.
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anything) to avoid the small risk of death (and if he has no money at all, he might
be unable to spend anything to avoid the small risk of death).110 At the other
extreme, a billionaire might be willing to spend a million dollars (and not a mere
$900) to avoid a 1/10,000 risk of death.111
Thus, using the VSL approach gives us the result that someone who is very
poor (“Poor”) might have a VSL of, say, $100, whereas someone who is very
rich (“Rich”) might have a VSL of, say, $10 billion. If we have a tort system
with an individuated approach (as I will argue we should), this would give us
the result that a potential tortfeasor would only have a cost of $100 if he kills
Poor, but would have a cost of $10 billion if he kills Rich.
This is problematic for two reasons: for a backward-looking reason and a
forward-looking reason. While this Article is focused primarily on the forwardlooking account, I will still briefly discuss the backward-looking reason here.
And I will also mention the backward-looking reason first, because it is likely
the one that jumps out to readers first when considering the above example.
To many readers, the fact that the tortfeasor would only have to pay $100
if he kills Poor but would have to pay $10 billion if he kills Rich is very unfair.
It seems that the wealth of the decedent should not be relevant to the
compensation sum on a backward-looking account. Furthermore, even if we are
careful in how we describe the sum of money and we make it clear that we are
not saying that the dollar sum is attempting to put a value or worth on the life
and thus saying that the values of Rich’s and Poor’s lives differ in some deeper
sense, it still seems as though the huge disparity in the monetary sum that the
tortfeasor would have to pay for Rich and Poor would appear unfair. Whether or
not one thinks that, from the backward-looking perspective, compensation for a
decedent’s hedonic loss to his estate is desirable, it seems clear that the
decedent’s wealth is and should be irrelevant to the amount of such
compensation. If the happiness loss of Rich and Poor was the same, and if the
purpose of “hedonic loss” damages is to provide compensation to the estates of
Rich and Poor for their loss of happiness (at least from the perspective of the
backward-looking lens), then it seems perverse to have the amounts made to the
two estates to differ—much less for one of the amounts to be $100 and the other
amount to be $10 billion dollars. On a backward-looking account, the wealth of
the decedent does not seem relevant to the determination of how much the
monetary remedy should be for hedonic loss. And this sums up what for many
readers might be a gut reaction to the unfairness of differing damages sum that
would be paid to the estates of Rich and Poor for their respective deaths.
As I have stated, however, the main purpose of this Article is to consider
the question of damages for hedonic loss through the lens of a “forward-looking”
approach to tort law. Thus, I now leave aside concerns of equity and focus purely
on the question from an efficiency standpoint.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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But this disparity between sums paid to Rich and Poor is also bad from an
efficiency standpoint. The happiness loss to Rich and Poor (we could stipulate)
is the same (due perhaps to the same number of expected future years that were
forgone, with each of the years in Rich’s future containing the same amount of
happiness as each of the years in Poor’s future), and thus the optimal incentives
should make it that the same amount of effort is expended by the potential
tortfeasor to prevent the respective deaths of Rich and Poor. Thus, with the VSL
approach, according to which the damages to be paid are a function of the
decedent’s wealth, the killing of Poor might be enormously under-deterred and
the killing of Rich might be enormously over-deterred.
In terms of the forward-looking account, what the foregoing shows us is
that the happiness-to-money translation is happening at the incorrect juncture in
the investigation of our topic. For the incentives to be optimal, we want the
potential tortfeasor to internalize the amount of happiness loss that would be
incurred by the victim. Thus, what we need is for the happiness-loss cost to the
victim to be borne by the tortfeasor (so that it will be taken into account in the
tortfeasor’s actions). What this then means is that the tortfeasor should be
incentivized to expend up to the amount of happiness that would be lost by the
victim (if he is killed) to prevent this loss of the victim (and these incentives
would be brought about by forcing the tortfeasor to pay this sum in damages in
tort). Up to what sum of money would this require the tortfeasor to expend? This
sum of money would be the sum of money, which, if expended by the tortfeasor
would cause him to have the happiness loss in question. Thus, what we see here
is that the happiness-to-money translation should be occurring on the
tortfeasor’s utility curve. This is importantly different from the VSL approach,
which uses the victim’s utility curve to translate happiness into money. I will
return to this in greater depth below.
In sum, it seems to be a mistake both on a backward-looking account and
on a forward-looking account for the dollar sum paid by a tortfeasor for the
decedent’s hedonic loss to at all be a function of the decedent’s wealth. The
underlying mistake is the same from both perspectives: carrying out the
happiness-to-money translation on the decedent’s utility curve. This renders the
compensation dependent on the decedent’s wealth. But the decedent’s wealth
cannot be relevant to an articulation of her loss from any perspective, because
(1) the actual loss is in happiness rather than wealth and (2) it cannot be
translated from happiness to wealth if this translation is carried out on the
decedent’s utility curve. From the backward-looking perspective, the result is an
injustice: gross under-compensation of Poor. From the forward-looking
perspective, it is inefficient: the cost internalized by potential tortfeasors is
rendered arbitrary and therefore cannot provide optimal incentives. Both
problems can be avoided by switching to a monetary-loss calculation on the
tortfeasor’s utility curve.
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C. SUMMARY
The proponent of the VSL approach would not deny that happiness is what
the decedent has lost. He would agree. And then, he would say, he is trying to
find a way to quantify that loss in terms of dollars. I, too, agree that we need to
carry out a translation from happiness to dollars. After all, figuring out how best
to do so indeed is the entire purpose of this Article. In my view, however, the
problem with the VSL approach is that it carries out the happiness-to-money
translation at the wrong juncture of the analysis. Instead of carrying out this
translation on the utility curve of the decedent, we instead should carry out the
translation somewhere else—namely on the utility curve of the tortfeasor.
Having identified the problem and alluded to the solution, I now turn to
offering my proposed alternative to VSL. As I will argue, this proposal is not
afflicted by the same difficulties that afflict the VSL approach.

III. MY ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
This Part elaborates on my proposal, and it further explains how it is not
afflicted by the problems that I have argued afflict the VSL approach. In
particular, as I will argue, this proposal is better than the VSL account in two
key ways—related to the two arguments against VSL raised above. First, and
most importantly: My account brings about optimal incentives for future
potential tortfeasors whereas the VSL account brings about suboptimal
incentives for future potential tortfeasors. Second, talking about the “monetary
loss of the decedent” in the way that the VSL approach speaks about it does not
even make theoretical sense, but my account avoids this problem and enables
us, coherently, to provide a solution to the “infinity problem.”112
I first elaborate on how my proposal works in theory, and I then explain
how it works in practice.
A. MY ACCOUNT
1.

Overview

As stated above, we can stipulate that the happiness loss to Rich and Poor
is the same, and thus the optimal incentives should make it that the same amount
of effort is expended by the potential tortfeasor to prevent the respective deaths
of Rich and Poor. More specifically, we want the potential tortfeasor to
internalize the amount of happiness loss that would be incurred by the victim.
What this then means is that the tortfeasor should be incentivized to expend up
to the amount of happiness that would be lost by the victim (if he is killed) to
prevent this loss of the victim, and these incentives would be brought about by
forcing the tortfeasor to pay this cost as damages in tort. What sum of money
would this happiness sum amount to? This sum of money would be the sum,
112. See supra Part I.B.
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which, expended by the tortfeasor, would cause him to have the happiness loss
in question. Thus, the happiness-to-money translation occurs on the tortfeasor’s
utility curve.
The alternative approach proposed in this Article is outlined as follows:
Step 1: Determining what the relevant amount of happiness loss is.
(A): Determining who the correct person or group of people are for
determining happiness loss, and determining whether to use expected or
actual loss.
(i): Determining who the correct person or group of people are for
determining happiness loss.
(ii): Determining whether to use expected or actual loss.
(B): Determining how much happiness the relevant person or group of
people lost.
(i): The empirical questions about the relevant person’s (or group of
people’s) expected future(s).
(ii): The theoretical question about which aggregation mechanism to
espouse.
Step 2: Translating the happiness loss into a dollar-sum loss on the tortfeasor’s
utility curve.

2. Details
The first step in carrying out my theory is to determine what the relevant
amount of happiness loss of the decedent is (be it (1) an “actual” loss or an
“expected” loss, and (2) be it a loss to the decedent or a loss to a larger group of
possible or foreseeable decedents). The second step is to translate this amount
of happiness loss into a dollar sum of loss on the tortfeasor’s utility curve. Both
steps will involve a number of sub-steps.
Step 1: Determining what the relevant amount of happiness loss is. The
first step is to determine what the relevant amount of happiness loss is. This step
has a few subsections. The first subsection involves, first, the theoretical step of
determining whether we want to focus on expected loss or actual loss, and
second, the empirical step of identifying who the correct person or group of
people are for determining the happiness loss. The second subsection involves
identifying how much happiness this person or group of people lost.
Step 1A: Determining who the correct person or group of people are for
determining happiness loss, and determining whether to use expected or actual
loss.
Step 1.A.i: Since we are considering a forward-looking account, which
focuses on bringing about optimal incentives for potential tortfeasors, the
question is whom the tortfeasor knew or had reason to know that he was risking
harming. In some cases, it might be that there was reason to know that only the
particular decedent was the one who was being exposed to the risk. If so, then
the analysis would be about what the loss (be it actual loss or expected loss) was
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to this specific decedent. If, however, the risk were to a broader group of people,
then the appropriate determination would be about what the expected happiness
loss to this broader group of possible victims would be—be it that whole
population or be it some narrower subset of the population (for example, people
who fly on planes). (If we are considering a group of people and not just the
decedent, then we would certainly be using expected loss and not actual loss,
because there was no actual loss to anyone in the group other than the decedent.)
Thus, the first task is to determine the relevant person or people to consider the
happiness loss of. This inquiry will be case-specific and empirical.
Step 1.A.ii: Next, we must answer the question of whether to use actual or
expected losses of happiness. In other words, actual loss is the loss of happiness
that the decedent actually incurred, and the expected loss is the happiness loss
that the tortfeasor would have had reason to foresee that the decedent would
incur if he were to die. The determination of whether to use actual or expected
losses seems to be a theoretical question that, for the most part, is not casespecific (but, rather, which would be a question of law113), and which involves
precisifying my account—not resolving specific applications of my account in
certain cases. As stated above, this question would only arise if we are
considering only the loss to the victim himself, because if we were considering
a broader group of “possible victims,” then we would necessarily be taking an
expected-loss approach and not an actual-loss approach.
Reasonable minds could differ regarding whether we should use actual loss
or expected loss. And, furthermore, there might be intermediate positions
according to which a hybrid position is used. This type of a question arises
elsewhere in tort law as well: According to the eggshell skull rule, tort
defendants are typically liable for the amount of actual losses (and not merely
foreseeable losses) even if the extent of the damages are much greater than
expected (that is, because the victim has an “eggshell skull”), but in order for the
defendant to be liable for the actual losses, the type of injury must have been
foreseeable.114 The context here in this Article could import a type of distinction
similar to that which is used in the eggshell skull rule, but other options are
possible as well.
It seems to me that, consistent with the notion of basing damages on facts
about the tortfeasor (for example, his financial position, his mental state, his
incentives and cost-benefit analyses, and so on), we should probably focus on

113. See generally Benn v. Thomas, 512 N.W.2d 537 (Iowa 1994).
114. See, e.g., id. at 539–40.
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expected losses and not on actual losses.115 And, going forward, this will be the
assumption I make (though I will often refer, simply, to “losses”).116
Step 1B: Determining how much happiness the relevant person or group
of people lost. Having determined which person or group of people are the
relevant ones for determining the happiness loss and having determined whether
to use expected or actual loss, the next question is to determine how great the
happiness loss (or expected happiness loss) would be for this person (or group
of people). This task itself involves a few nested subsections. Step 1Bi addresses
empirical questions and Step 1Bii addresses a theoretical question.
Step 1Bi: The empirical questions about the relevant person’s (or group of
people’s) expected future(s). First, we need to make empirical estimates about
the person’s future. We need to estimate both how many years of life the person
would have lived if not for the tort, and we need to estimate how happy these
years would have been for the person.
For the former question, we can rely on information about the person’s age
and data on life expectancies in the population. This analysis can then be tailored
more specifically to this person, first by considering generic categories such as
whether the person is male or female, but also by considering information about
his health that we might know, and so on.
With respect to this question of determining how many years of life the
decedent would have lived if not for the premature death, my view is that courts
should employ a rebuttable presumption that the number of years that the
decedent would have lived is equal to the life expectancy in the United States
for a person of the decedent’s sex minus his or her current age. This estimate
could then be rebutted by evidence that the parties introduce. In implementing
my proposal there will then be questions that would need to get ironed out by
courts regarding how demanding of an evidentiary burden parties would be
required to meet in their attempts to rebut the presumption.117
As for the question of how happy these years would have been, we can
explore (1) data about how happy this particular individual had been, (2) data on
typical trajectories of people’s happiness over various ages, and then (3) any
information about how and why we could expect this person’s future happiness
to conform or not conform to that typical trajectory. Further, if we are going to

115. It’s important to note that even though I have distinguished between actual loss and expected loss, in
reality both are types of expected loss, because we cannot know the future. Notwithstanding this wrinkle, I will
still refer to these two as “actual loss” and “expected loss.”
116. This approach has the further benefit that the same approach can be used in the context of focusing on
just the decedent as well as focusing on a broader group of possible victims for the determination of happiness
loss—whereas were we to use actual losses in the context of just the decedent, we would still have to use the
expected losses approach if we were focusing on a group of possible victims.
117. Though the question of how demanding of a burden should be employed by the courts for rebutting the
presumption is an important one and also an interesting one, I do not address this question here.
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attempt to quantify a person’s happiness, based on the type of information just
described, we will of course need to articulate a metric, or a unit, of happiness.
I have discussed this topic at length elsewhere,118 but my view is that the
seeming difficulty of quantifying happiness, and also the lack of a particular
metric that we currently use, does not pose a problem here. We could use a
variety of possible measures that could do the work we need it to, and certain
measures, such as the “quality-adjusted life-year” (QALY), have been
suggested.119
With respect to this “future wellbeing quantification” prong of the analysis,
my view is that here, too, the courts can make use of a rebuttable presumption.
In particular, one way to administer this prong of my proposal would be to use
a wellbeing quantification scale according to which one’s wellbeing ranges
anywhere from a “1” to a “5,” where “1” means “having an extremely small
amount of happiness,” “2” means “having a smaller than average amount of
happiness,” “3” means “having an average amount of happiness,” “4” means
“having a larger than average amount of happiness,” and “5” means “having an
extremely large amount of happiness.” As for the rebuttable presumption, it
would be that the decedent’s future years would have been at a level 3. As was
the case for the rebuttable presumption in the context of life expectancy, this
estimate could then be rebutted by evidence that the parties introduce. In
implementing my proposal, there will then be questions that would need to get
ironed out by courts regarding how demanding of an evidentiary burden parties
would be required to meet in their attempts to rebut the presumption.120
Step 1Bii: The theoretical question about which aggregation mechanism to
espouse. After having established how many years the person was expected to
have lost and how much happiness was expected to be contained in those years,
the next key step in determining how much happiness was lost by the person is
to determine which “aggregation function” (or “aggregation mechanism”) we
think is the relevant one for determining what the happiness amount is for that
whole chunk of years, given the inputs that we have already determined
quantities for. While some might think that the value of the happiness of the

118. See Michael Pressman, Calculating Compensation Sums for Private Law Wrongs: Underlying
Imprecisions, Necessary Questions, and Toward a Plausible Account of Damages for Lost Years of Life, 53 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 597 (2020).
119. The QALY is a measure of quality and quantity of life. For early proponents of the measure, see, for
example, Herbert E. Klarman, John O’S. Francis & Gerald D. Rosenthal, Cost Effectiveness Analysis Applied to
the Treatment of Chronic Renal Disease, 6 MED. CARE 48 (1968); Sol Fanshel & J.W. Bush, A Health-Status
Index and Its Application to Health-Services Outcomes, 18 OPERATIONS RSCH. 1021 (1970); George W.
Torrance, Warren H. Thomas & David L. Sackett, A Utility Maximization Model for Evaluation of Health Care
Programs, 7 HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 118 (1972); Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving
Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (1976).
120. Similarly, in the case of this rebuttable presumption, though the question of how demanding of a burden
should be employed by the courts for rebutting the presumption is an important one and also an interesting one,
I do not address this question here.
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whole future equals the sum of the value of each year in the future, thus
espousing a sum-aggregative aggregation mechanism, this is not the only
possible approach. On the other end of the spectrum would be an averaging view
according to which, for example, the happiness of the future is equal to the
average happiness of each of the future years. Additionally, one could espouse
hybrid views that give some weight to quantity of years and to quality of years.
Determining which aggregation mechanism to espouse is a challenging task,
which I explore in depth elsewhere,121 and there are strong reasons for and
against the various possible views. Choosing an aggregation mechanism to
espouse, however, whichever it might be, is a crucial step in determining how
much expected happiness the person lost. It might seem prima facie, however,
as though it does not matter which aggregation mechanism we choose because
it might appear that the different accounts would simply be different ways of
describing the same data and that they would not result in different prescriptions.
As we will see, this indeed might be the case if the expected number of years
lost by the decedent were equal to the expected number of years that the
tortfeasor has left to live, but if this is not the case, then the different aggregation
mechanisms would indeed result in different prescriptions on my account.122
Further, since in most cases the expected loss of years of the decedent will not
be identical to the expected number of years remaining in the tortfeasor’s life,
the choice of aggregation mechanism will almost always affect the prescriptions
on my account. Thus, it indeed is crucial to articulate which aggregation
mechanism is most plausible.
Step 2: Translating the happiness loss into a dollar-sum loss on the
tortfeasor’s utility curve. At this point we will have come to a determination of
how much happiness was lost. The next step is to determine how much of a
monetary loss to the tortfeasor would bring about a happiness loss of this amount
to him.
I first address how, in theory, this might work. Next, I provide more details
about how we could carry this out in practice.
As for how, in theory, we should strive to arrive at the correct dollar sum:
To consider this question, we will explore questions similar to those that we
explored in attempting to determine the decedent’s happiness loss. For one, we
will import our determination of which aggregation mechanism we find most

121. See Michael Pressman, Aggregating Happiness: A Framework for Exploring Compensation for Lost
Years of Life, 69 DEPAUL L. REV. 875 (2020).
122. The reason for this is that that if the expected length of the forgone future of the decedent is a different
from the expected length of the remaining life of the tortfeasor, then this is an example of what I call a “differentnumbers case.” For detailed discussions of “different-numbers cases” and the difficulties associated with
satisfactorily resolving them, see Pressman, supra note 118, and Pressman, supra note 121.
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plausible.123 Next, we will explore the same types of information about the
tortfeasor as we did about the decedent in our inquiry into determining the
amount of his happiness loss. For example, for one, we will consider how many
years left we expect the tortfeasor to have in his life. Thus, suppose, for example,
that we espouse a sum-aggregative aggregation function and that we determined
that the decedent’s expected loss was sixty units of happiness (twenty years of
life of a happiness level of 3). Now suppose that the tortfeasor’s expected future
is fifty years long. If so, we would want to distribute the sixty-unit loss across
those fifty years, and we thus would strive to impose on the tortfeasor a loss of
1.2 units of happiness per year. If, on the other hand, we espoused an averaging
view in a case with these same facts, we then, instead, might strive to lower the
tortfeasor’s happiness level by three units per year.124
The next key task in exploring information about the tortfeasor is to infer
what his utility curve would look like. In other words, we attempt to determine
how much of a monetary loss would bring about the particular happiness loss
we are striving to inflict on him. In order to determine this, various things could
be relevant—most importantly, the tortfeasor’s wealth. This is because people
typically have diminishing marginal utility of wealth125 and we can make
generalizations about the person’s utility function (for example, what the slope
of the curve is at the current moment) based on his wealth. We could thus create
a master function, based on empirical studies, which could serve as a default
utility-to-money translation table. This essentially would amount to a typical
function of this sort across all people in the population (that is, averaging across
all possible dispositions (note that this is not averaging across different wealth
levels126)).
This, in theory, is what we should be attempting to do. As for how, in
practice, to carry this out, I propose the following. And, as with my suggestion
for how to carry out the determination of how much happiness was lost by the
decedent, the following determination involves the use of rebuttable
presumptions. Also, the reader should be forewarned that, in the following
explanation, it will seem as though I am employing VSL—the very notion that
I have been decrying the use of! Bear with me for a few short paragraphs and I

123. In my view, this is something that should remain constant in our analysis and should not be personspecific. One could, however, argue that this too should be person-specific, but I will assume for our purposes
that it is held constant.
124. Note that, as I discuss elsewhere, see Pressman, supra note 121, there are different versions of
averaging views.
125. For an early discussion of this phenomenon, see JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY WITH SOME OF THEIR APPLICATIONS TO SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 804 (W.J. Ashley ed., Longmans, Green
& Co. 1909) (1848).
126. Note that this is not averaging across different wealth levels in the population. Different wealth levels
constitute different points on the x-axis. Rather, the curve that I’m suggesting we use would be one that averages
across the utility curves of all people, where each person’s utility curve shows what their utility would be for
each possible wealth amount that they might have. Thus, for the purposes of creating this averaging curve, it is
not relevant what amount of wealth any particular person actually has.
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will then explain why my usage of VSL in this context (when exploring the
tortfeasor) is not problematic. (Also, as I will show, there also is an additional
version of the below approach that I think is slightly better and that also does
not rely on the same data.)
The question here is what dollar sum would bring about a loss to the
tortfeasor of the “happiness amount” that was lost by the decedent. Here I
suggest we use as a benchmark an individuated VSL sum for the tortfeasor: We
currently have a VSL sum (circa $9 million) that averages across the whole
population. Using the same data, if we took note of wealth and, say, age of
people in the studies, we could obtain more fine-grained VSL data that is a
function of wealth and age. Then, in order to determine which portion of the data
corresponds to this tortfeasor, we could have presumptions that (1) the number
of years of life that the tortfeasor has left is equal to typical life expectancy for
a person of his or her sex in the United States minus his or her age, and that (2)
he or she is of average happiness (that is, at a level 3). Again, these presumptions
would be rebuttable. Then, suppose that, using the individuated VSL data, we
were to get the result that the tortfeasor’s VSL is, say, $20 million. Suppose
further that the presumptions are un-rebutted and we have the finding that he has
twenty years of average happiness left. We then can attribute a dollar sum to a
year of average happiness: $1 million. If the decedent lost, say, thirty such years,
we can then arrive at a dollar sum to be paid by the tortfeasor for the hedonic
loss: $30 million.127
Here, however, the reader might be surprised to see my suggestion that we
use the VSL framework, since I have been arguing against this framework.
Despite appearances to the contrary, however, my usage of the VSL framework
in this context does not run afoul of the points that I have made in this Article
up until now. Here is why:
In the context of the usage of VSL on the decedent’s utility curve, those
who espouse the VSL approach take as an input what people would pay/accept
to avoid/incur an increased chance of death of 1/10,000, and then they infer a
dollar sum to be attributed to the full loss of life. What I have objected to is the
inference that a dollar sum can be attributed to the full life. In the context here,
however, I am instead using the VSL data to make inferences from the dollar
sum attributable to an increased chance of death of 1/10,000 to the dollar sum
attributable to the loss of, say, 1/20 of one’s future twenty years of life. (I did
refer to the VSL of $20 million, but what I was really doing was going from a
dollar valuation of a risk to a dollar valuation of a finite portion of one’s expected
future, and I was referring to the VSL as shorthand to help make the calculation

127. If the presumption of a happiness level of 3 is rebutted and shown to be, say, a 4, there certainly will
be questions about how much of a dollar shift this would entail. This type of imprecision, however, does not
seem to be different in kind from types of determinations that get made in compensating for non-economic harms
in cases that do not involve death. Thus, although there would not be perfect precision, I think that this does
constitute a tractable framework.
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clearer.) Although the various “non-fatal” and “fine-tuning” concerns with the
VSL approach apply here, the gripes that I myself raised do not afflict this type
of an inference about trading money for life-years (when the life-years do not
constitute one’s entire future). Thus, I do think that this approach can be used to
develop a benchmark for trading off money for life-years.
Despite the fact that, in my view, this type of usage of the VSL framework
is workable for establishing a benchmark in this context, I think that we can do
better. The VSL strategy that uses as data what people are willing to accept/pay
for the incurring/avoiding the increased chance of death of 1/10,000 is
susceptible to the various fine-tuning concerns addressed in Part I.B.128 Many of
these can be avoided if we instead use the following approach to this data: A
better benchmark can be reached on the tortfeasor’s utility curve by, instead of
using labor force and consumption decision data about what people would
pay/accept to avoid/incur an increased chance of death of 1/10,000, instead using
the results of surveys of what people (of various ages and with various amounts
of wealth, and so on) would pay/accept for an increase or decrease of one’s life
by one year, and then extrapolate from this sum to determine the benchmark on
the tortfeasor’s utility curve. Although this would be dealing with hypotheticals
rather than seeing how people indeed make decisions in these situations, this
data would be better because it would directly address cases of certain loss of a
period of one’s future, rather than cases of a percent risk of a full loss of life.
This approach would thus much more directly and accurately help us determine
(or estimate) how much money a person would accept for the loss of happiness
of a year of life. To be clear, however, this questionnaire-based suggestion of
mine would still amount to an exploration of how people trade off dollars versus
life-years (quality versus quantity of life), and it thus is of the same general type
of approach as the VSL-based approach to getting a benchmark, and thus this
just amounts to a way of tweaking the benchmark. But I do think that this would
be an improvement over the VSL-based benchmark. And, further, even the VSLbased benchmark discussed here does not, in my view, fall prey to the arguments
against the standard usage of VSL that I have made throughout the Article up
until here.
In sum, using the framework articulated here and making the presumptions
described—unless successfully rebutted by the parties—would enable us to
determine what dollar sum in damages would bring about a loss in wellbeing to
the tortfeasor that would equal the wellbeing loss that the decedent incurred as
a result of his or her premature death. To the extent that any of the presumptions

128. See supra Part I.B.
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are successfully rebutted by evidence introduced by the parties, the appropriate
dollar sum for damages should then be adjusted accordingly.129130
This is the sketch of how my proposal works. There are of course additional
questions about aspects of how this will be implemented. I address some of these
questions below in Part IV.131
B. MORE IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS AND SOME BLUEPRINTS FROM OTHER
AREAS OF THE LAW
This Subpart further addresses the question of what reforms I am
advocating for in order to implement my account. The main general reform I am
advocating for, of course, is that the damages sum for decedents’ hedonic losses
be determined in the way that I have articulated. But this will involve changes
to how a few different topics are handled by the legal system, and then, within
each topic, there will be a variety of specific reforms needed.
As for which topics will need to be handled differently, the two main ones,
which are described separately in what follows, are: (1) the relevance of, and
inquiry into, the defendant’s wealth; and (2) the relevance of, and inquiry into,
facts about the happiness and mental life of both parties (and often of broader
groups of individuals in society, be it the entire population or some smaller
subset thereof).
Although changes will indeed need to be made in both domains, in neither
domain are the new procedures ones that are entirely new to the law as a whole.
In both contexts, there are other areas of the law to which we can turn for
guidance and for a blueprint of how to carry out reform in this area of the law.
This is particularly the case in the context of the relevance of the defendant’s
wealth to damages. Here we can learn a lot from the treatment of this issue in
the context of punitive damages. In the context of inquiring into happiness,
although there is not a single analogous domain that currently implements the
changes I advocate for, we can learn somewhat from a number of areas,
including our current treatment in tort of cases of non-economic damages.

129. To the extent the reader is concerned about the lack of perfect precision in translating wellbeing loss
into a dollar sum, the reader should note that this is not a concern that uniquely afflicts my approach here. This
precision is also lacking in any award of non-economic damages—even in cases that do not involve death:
Similarly, in non-death cases of non-economic damages, there is far from a precise science about how translate
lost wellbeing into money, and we simply try to determine what sum of money would bring about the particular
gain or loss of wellbeing (which in a non-death non-economic damages case would be trying to put the plaintiff
back on his original indifference curve).
130. Further information could also perhaps be introduced in order to depart from the calculation described,
though there could perhaps be limitations on additional data to be introduced, and even if additional data could
be introduced, there could perhaps be a demanding standard making it difficult to rebut the standard
presumptions.
131. There are also, however, some theoretical objections that one might have. For one, one might think that
the happiness of one person cannot be compared to that of another. While I think that it’s hard to make
comparisons in this domain with precision, I do think that the endeavor is still a workable one. I consider this
topic further elsewhere. See Pressman, supra note 118.
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This is not to say that novel and complex issues of implementation and
administration will not arise in the current context, but it does mean that in
implementing these changes we will not be starting from scratch.
Within the contexts of (1) the relevance of, and inquiry into, the
defendant’s wealth; and (2) the relevance of, and inquiry into, the happiness and
mental life of both parties and possibly people in the broader population, various
specific changes will need to be made. Although these proposals for changes
will take various forms, the vast majority of them will be directed at judges. In
the vast majority of cases, the place for the changes to be made is likely in jury
instructions—with various additions and subtractions being needed. This is
because in most of these instances, the relevant changes are within the judge’s
discretion. In other instances, however, it might be less clear whether a change
is within the judge’s discretion, and the change might require prior conclusions
as a matter of law. In some (though not all) of even these instances, however,
the appropriate conclusion as a matter of law might be a function of the judge’s
determinations about the merits of my account. In some situations, however, the
implementation of aspects of my account might require changes to be made by
actors other than judges. For example, these changes could take the form of a
change to a rule of evidence. Furthermore, in some instances, legislative changes
might either be required or, even if not required, it might be the best option so
as to bring about greater uniformity in the practices of individual judges.
For all of these considerations of what gear in the legal machinery must
carry out a particular change, and whether a particular change is required, the
answers will, of course, often vary by jurisdiction.
1. The Relevance of, and Inquiry into, a Defendant’s Wealth
My account introduces a few moving parts, and one of these is the
relevance of a defendant’s wealth for the damages sum representing the
decedent’s hedonic loss. This, however, is not a completely new type of concept
that the courts would have to adopt. (And, importantly, note that it is also the
case that on an individuated VSL account, one party’s wealth would be relevant
as well—albeit the wealth of the decedent rather than that of the defendant—so
it too would have this feature.) Although a defendant’s wealth typically is not
admissible for the determination of damages, there is a context in which the
defendant’s wealth typically is admissible for the determination of damages:
punitive damages award determinations.
Further, and as I will also mention in Part IV.C, below, there are also
various ways in which states place certain restrictions on punitive damages
sums.132 For instance, some states place limits on the size of the punitive
damages award, and in California, for example, some courts have limited
punitive damages so that they are not greater than ten percent of a defendant’s

132. See infra Part IV.C.
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net worth.133 There is, however, an ongoing debate about whether punitive
damages calculations should consider the wealth of the defendant, and about
various related sub-issues.134 In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States
has required punitive damages sums to bear certain relationships to
compensatory damages sums—requiring, as a general rule (though there indeed
are exceptions), that the punitive damages sum not be greater than nine times the
compensatory damages sum, and holding that punitive damages sums exceeding
this ratio violate due process.135
In sum, both because a defendant’s wealth can be relevant in the context of
punitive damages, and because of the various details about how courts have
addressed various restrictions on the size of punitive damages awards and other
details about what sums for punitive damages can be proper, the context of
punitive damages can be used as a blueprint for how a defendant’s wealth can
be used in the context of damages awards for a decedent’s hedonic loss. Further,
and as I will also address in Part IV.C, because in the context of punitive
damages there have been restrictions on the amount of damages, if we were to
determine that in the hedonic-loss context we similarly would want to have
certain reductions and restrictions on damages, this is another way in which the
punitive damages context could be helpful in providing a blueprint for the
context of hedonic-loss damages.
Thus, in determining the procedures and practices regarding how to have
the damages sum be a function of the defendant’s wealth (and also in considering
various concerns that might arise in doing so136), we can look to the punitivedamages context for guidance.

133. Storage Servs. v. Oosterbaan, 262 Cal. Rptr. 689, 700–01 (Ct. App. 1989); Michelson v. Hamada, 36
Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 359 (Ct. App. 1994).
134. See Leila C. Orr, Making a Case for Wealth-Calibrated Punitive Damages, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1739,
1770 (2004); Keith N. Hylton, A Theory of Wealth and Punitive Damages, 17 WIDENER L.J. 927, 928–29 (2008).
But see Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of
Defendant’s Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 415–16 (1989) (arguing that defendant’s wealth is irrelevant to the
goal of deterring socially undesirable conduct and thus should not be considered in assessing punitive damages).
135. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 424–25 (2003); see also BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581–82 (1996); Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 352–53 (2007).
136. While various potential problems could arise when courts (and juries) consider a defendant’s wealth to
be relevant for the determination of damages, once such potential problem is the concern that juries might use
information about defendants’ wealth in impermissible ways. For example, juries might be tempted to make the
deep-pocketed defendant pay a large sum in damages just because he can, and the jury might be seeking to do
what in their view might be furthering distributive justice in society. This concern and a variety of related ones
are serious and must be carefully guarded against. There are, however, ways in which the law deals with these
types of concerns, and in my view, these are probably sufficient. Once again, we can look to the context of
punitive damages for guidance both regarding possible problems to watch out for and, also, regarding possible
solutions to these problems.
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2. Relevance of, and Inquiry into, the Happiness and Mental Life of the
Parties (and Possibly of Others)
The second key area of change required by my account in order for the
appropriate analysis to be carried out is for various forms of happiness data to
be taken into account in determining the damages sum—and thus for this data
to be introduced into evidence. We will need to obtain data in some cases about
the expected future happiness of the specific decedent, and in other cases this
same data for broader groups of the population. Similar data will need to be
obtained for the tortfeasor.
Additionally, determinations will need to be made about which aggregation
mechanism (for aggregating happiness across years of a life) is the most
plausible, and there are various ways in which juries or courts can come to
determinations about this. First of all, this determination could be left to the
judge. Second, it could be left for the jury to determine, and, if so, there could
be a wide range of guidance or non-guidance that they could receive in jury
instructions (not only in terms of how restrictive or non-restrictive the jury
instructions are regarding requiring certain conclusions about the aggregation
mechanism, but also in terms of how much or little non-binding and simply
helpful guidance the court provides in the jury instructions). Additionally,
questions arise about the details of what aspects of these topics can be testified
to by expert witnesses.
While ironing out the details of how courts can and should determine the
answers to a number of these procedural questions is beyond the scope of this
Article,137 the key areas of change here, as with the topic of the defendant’s
wealth, are areas that are largely within the discretion of the judge, and thus the
reform proposals are primarily directed to judges. As with the topic of the
defendant’s wealth, however, there might be some reform proposals directed
toward those writing the rules of evidence and, in some cases, the target of the
proposals might be the legislature—either because this would be necessary or
because the uniformity it would effectuate would be desirable.
C. SUMMARY
The VSL approach carries out the happiness-to-money translation on the
decedent’s utility function. My account, on the other hand, which this Part has
provided a sketch of, carries out the happiness-to-money translation on the
tortfeasor’s utility function. Arguing for the shift of the happiness-to-money
translation onto the tortfeasor’s utility curve is the key move of this Article. In
my view, the proposal that I offer has two key advantages over the VSL approach
(and avoids falling prey to the problems I raised for the VSL approach): (1) It
brings about optimal incentives for potential tortfeasors, since it forces them to

137. I tackle these and related questions in my article, The Relevance of Defendants’ Wealth for ForwardLooking, Backward-Looking, and Mixed Accounts of Tort Damages. See Pressman, supra note 17.
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internalize the actual loss to the decedent; and (2) it avoids the incoherence
problem faced by the VSL account, which must rely on the meaningless concept
of “monetary loss to the decedent.”
Note, however, that at this point it would be premature to declare that my
proposal is superior to the VSL approach. This is for two reasons. First, I have
not yet engaged with Arlen’s arguments (mentioned in Part I.C)138, and I have
not yet explained how and why my proposal is immune to her important points.
Second, I have not yet raised and considered a variety of other possible
considerations and objections that probe the plausibility and viability of my
proposal. In Part IV, I will carry out both of these tasks—thus providing further
clarification of my proposal and providing a more robust defense of my
proposal.
Before doing so, however, I first briefly explain that my proposal has
implications that extend far beyond the context of cases involving death. Indeed,
my proposal has implications for all of tort law, more generally, and even for
various areas of the law outside of tort law. In particular, my arguments here, if
persuasive, threaten some of the foundational assumptions of the law-andeconomics literature and the willingness-to-pay literature. I address these
extensions in detail elsewhere,139 but here I just briefly mention the broader
implications that my proposal in this Article has:
Up until now, I have been discussing my positive proposal in the context
of providing a remedy to wrongful-death plaintiffs for decedents’ hedonic loss.
While this context indeed is my primary focus in this Article, my positive
proposal’s claims about (1) optimal (forward-looking) incentives being brought
about by damages rules that require tortfeasors to internalize the happiness cost
that their activities impose on others; and (2) the relevance of using the
tortfeasor’s utility curve, are also intended to apply, much more broadly, to tort
law on the whole (and beyond tort to other areas of the law). In order for tort law
to bring about optimal incentives, tort damages should always require tortfeasors
to internalize the happiness costs that their activities impose on others, and
translating happiness to money on the defendant’s utility curve is of key
importance in doing so. This is a normative claim. The law, I argue, should do
this if it wants to bring about optimal incentives going forward for potential
tortfeasors. I also, however, in part provide a descriptive version of this claim: I
argue that in most—though, not in all—non-death situations, the damages
measure in tort that is currently used is indeed both consistent with and
ultimately rooted in the rationales behind these arguments of mine.
This descriptive claim may seem surprising, and that is because, as I show
elsewhere,140 in most cases it seems that tort law does not use the defendant’s
utility curve, and it instead typically uses the plaintiff’s utility curve. (Indeed,
138. See supra Part I.C.
139. See Pressman, supra note 17.
140. Id.
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the ubiquity of using the plaintiff’s utility curve is the reason why it was assumed
by proponents of VSL, and seemingly everyone else, that we must use the
plaintiff’s utility curve in our attempt to determine the damages sum to attribute
to plaintiffs’ hedonic loss in wrongful death suits.) I show why it is that we
typically use the plaintiff’s utility function in determining a damages sum, and
why this common way of determining damages is not inconsistent with my
theory. I also, however, show that there are some situations in which using the
plaintiff’s utility function is not consistent with my theory, and I argue that in
these situations it is our practices that should be revised.
Thus, interestingly, while I had set out to provide a plausible account of
what dollar sum for hedonic-loss damages in wrongful-death suits would
provide optimal incentives going forward for future potential tortfeasors, it turns
out that exploring this context enables us to learn something more fundamental
about tort law on the whole (as well as about other areas of the law, and about
core principles underlying law-and-economics theory). This more fundamental
insight was previously obscured in non-death contexts.141

IV. A CLARIFICATION AND CONSIDERING FOUR OBJECTIONS
This Part considers and responds to a number of objections to my proposal
(that is, my main proposal for damages in death cases). First, however, I discuss
a key point of clarification. This point of clarification will tie into aspects of a
number of the objections I raise in this Part, and it will serve as a preemptive
partial response to aspects of these objections.
Although my account in theory states that the most efficient results will be
brought about by calculating compensation for decedents’ hedonic loss in
wrongful-death cases by using the defendant’s utility curve, there will likely be
various efficiency considerations in practice that cut in other directions. We must
take into account people’s tastes for fairness (which could be at odds with the
prescriptions of the Hand Theorem142) and other preferences that people might
have and take these at face value and treat them as fixed; we must consider
various considerations of administrability; and we must consider various
incentive effects. All of these factors might render it more efficient in certain
cases to employ a VSL account that makes the happiness-to-money translation
on the decedent’s utility curve, or to employ something wholly different from
the account that I have proposed. Thus, even on my account, there might be good
141. If my arguments on non-death cases are successful, they not only provide support for my claims about
tort law on the whole, but they will also reinforce my arguments specifically in the context of death. After all,
support for my theory broadly construed is also support for one of its specific applications—namely, the context
of hedonic-loss damages in wrongful-death suits.
142. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). According to Learned
Hand’s famous formula (“The Hand Theorem”), a party has breached his duty of reasonable care when the
burden of taking a precaution to prevent a loss is less than the loss multiplied by the probability of the loss
occurring absent the precaution being taken. Hence, Hand’s Theorem is represented mathematically as B = P *
L, where the duty has been breached when the precaution is not taken, and B is less than P * L. Id.
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reason to adopt VSL in some (or possibly, it could turn out, even in all) cases.
This will not render my proposal less correct, and it likely would not even reduce
its value much.143 Thus, regardless of how the theoretical and practical
efficiency considerations end up weighing against each other on net, my
proposal and arguments will still remain valuable. Although I have not said here
whether I think my account is still efficient in practice—and although an
empirical analysis of that question is beyond the scope of this Article—I will
argue, in Part V, that my account is almost certainly more efficient in practice
than the alternatives, just as it is in theory.
As we will see, a number of the objections I will raise in this Part will be
related to this pre-emptive clarification.
A. OBJECTION 1: WHY SHOULD WE INDIVIDUATE?
Objection 1 comes in two subparts: 1a and 1b.
Objection 1a: Why do we want individuation? In arguing that there was a
problem with the VSL approach, one of your main points was to argue that VSL
was bad because damages awards for hedonic loss would vary dramatically
based on the wealth of the decedent, potentially enabling Rich to receive billions
of dollars from a tortfeasor while Poor might receive one hundred dollars from
the tortfeasor, while we could stipulate that the hedonic loss to both Rich and
Poor was the same. Why is the solution not simply to use a uniform VSL sum,
which takes the average VSL value in the population as a whole and uses that
for all decedents regardless of how wealthy or poor they are? Since this resolves
one of your primary criticisms of VSL, perhaps we need not abandon it after all.
Objection 1b: Relatedly, but more generally: Why do we want
individuation in the tort system in the first place?
Before addressing this objection, I first mention a key point to keep in
mind: This objection is about what would in theory be efficient. Thus, it does
not matter here whether, for considerations of administrability or other practical
reasons, we want an individuated tort system or not. For the reasons stated in the
clarification at the beginning of Part IV, it is consistent with my account that we
would in some situations—or even in all situations—ultimately determine it
maximally efficient, in practice, to not individuate. The question here, however,
instead is about whether individuation is theoretically desirable.
Having said this, I now answer Objections 1a and 1b (in reverse order).
143. If it turns out that even in practice, my account should be implemented in all or most cases, that is
extremely valuable. But even if it turns out to only be in a very small number of cases that it should, in practice,
be implemented, this too would still be valuable. Further, even if it turns out that my proposal should never, in
practice, be implemented, the proposal is still valuable. This is for two reasons: (1) It might turn out there are
other sub-areas in the law where applying my proposal would indeed prescribe changes, so it is useful to become
clear on it in theory even in the context I discussed; and (2) even if there were no other areas where my account
would prescribe change, it still would be valuable to arrive at an accurate understanding of why it is that the
current state of the law is what it is, and according to my proposal, we have at the very least been operating
under a misunderstanding regarding the rationale for the current state of the law.
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Response to Objection 1b: In my view, the ideal indeed is for the results of
a case to be perfectly tailored to the litigants in the case. Why? This is a notion
that sits at the core of tort law. And for good reason. Leaving aside questions of
administrability, why would we ignore more information that could bring about
a better result—one that is more tailored to the specific case? We do not want to
just smooth over relevant facts. Notably, this is the case from both backwardlooking and forward-looking perspectives of tort law.
Response to Objection 1a: It is true that in identifying problems with the
VSL approach, I pointed to the fact that it seemed mistaken for the damages sum
for a decedent’s hedonic loss to be a function of the decedent’s wealth, and I
pointed to how an individuated version of VSL could yield enormous
discrepancies between what a tortfeasor would pay for killing Rich and for
killing Poor—and how this seemed to be a mistake according to both backwardlooking and forward-looking accounts of tort.
But, for the reasons given in response to Objection 1b, we do (at least in
theory) want an individuated account. Thus, even if a uniform VSL would
indeed be better than an individuated VSL in a certain way (namely, that the
damages sum paid for killing a person would not be a function of the particular
decedent’s wealth), this would simply be curing a symptom associated with an
individuated VSL account rather than curing the underlying problem. VSL
would continue to mistakenly base the damages sum on the wealth of victims
(even if it is based on an average across the whole population). It carries out the
happiness-to-money translation in the wrong place whether or not we
individuate. Instead, in my view, while the damages sum should be a function
of the decedent’s happiness loss (be it decedent-specific or be it an average
across the whole population or a subset thereof), it should not be a function of
the wealth of any decedent, individual or average. Rather, the person whose
wealth should be relevant for the determination of the damages sum is the
tortfeasor.
Thus, if the numbers strike us as mistaken after individuation, this is
because there is something wrong with the underlying theory that is getting us
those numbers, not with the individuation. It is the VSL approach’s location of
the happiness-to-money translation that causes the problem, not its
individuation.
B. OBJECTION 2: IS IT NOT BAD THAT, ON YOUR PROPOSAL, HEDONIC LOSS
DAMAGES WOULD VARY WILDLY DEPENDING ON THE TORTFEASOR’S
WEALTH?
Objection 2: You articulated a concern with an individuated VSL that it
would make the damages sum be a function of a decedent’s wealth and that the
resulting discrepancies between damages sums for the hedonic loss of poor and
rich decedents would be a bad result. But if we have an individuated account
that carries out the happiness-to-money translation on the tortfeasor’s utility
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curve, as your account advocates for, it seems that we would get a result that is
similar in the sense that the damages sums could vary just as drastically (due
here to the wealth differences between very poor and very rich defendants—as
opposed to being due to the wealth differences between very poor and very rich
decedents). But this seems to be problematic for the same reasons as in the case
of the damages discrepancy due to the discrepancy between decedents’ wealth,
namely: (1) It seems that the happiness loss to the decedents is the same (as we
could stipulate), and thus the damages sum should be the same; and (2) relatedly,
even if we are just looking at any particular case and there thus were no
“discrepancy” between the results in two different cases (and thus no horizontal
equity concerns), it seems that the damages sum for the decedent’s hedonic loss
would be so much a function of the defendant’s wealth that the damages sum
would feel arbitrary (and, seemingly, due to luck) from the perspective of the
plaintiff. And we seemingly do not want this type of luck to be playing such a
significant role in our tort system.
Response to Objection 2: First, with respect to the second aspect of this
objection, that the monetary amount the plaintiff receives seems arbitrary and
due too much to luck: It absolutely is not arbitrary. Yes, it might seem slightly
odd at first that the monetary loss is not fully determined by facts specific to the
decedent (as opposed to having the defendant’s wealth play a role), but, as I have
argued above: (1) It actually is incoherent to attempt to carry out the happinessto-money translation on the decedent’s utility curve because he no longer is alive
and there is no financial equivalent for the lost years that can be derived on his
utility curve, which does not exist; and (2) even if the happiness-to-money
translation could be carried out on the decedent’s utility curve, the optimally
efficient incentives would be produced by carrying out the translation on the
defendant’s utility curve. Thus, this method is not arbitrary; it is principled, and
it is efficient (at least in theory). Further, as stated above, it does crucially take
as an input the amount of happiness lost by the decedent; it thus fashions a
remedy that hypothetically compensates for this loss and makes the tortfeasor
internalize it in his decision-making.
Second, there indeed is truth to the concern that the damages sum is in part
a function of luck. The damages sum could vary widely and it might seem like
the plaintiff gets a windfall benefit if the tortfeasor is very rich and the plaintiff
gets a huge damages sum, and that the plaintiff gets very unlucky if it turns out
that the defendant is very poor and the plaintiff thus receives very little in
damages.
It is worth noting, however, that an individualized VSL system, though it
does not involve “luck” in the same sense, would involve an apparently
irrelevant factor in its determination of damages to the exact same degree,
namely, the wealth of the decedent. Thus, there is a sense in which both views
have this common. Furthermore, if we view the individuated VSL account from
the perspective of the tortfeasor, the exact same type of “luck” would be present,
because the damages sum would be highly affected by the wealth of the other
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party, and here the tortfeasor might have had no reason to know, in advance,
what the wealth of the person turning out to be the decedent would have been.
Of course, in my view, the decedent’s wealth indeed is irrelevant to the damages
sum, but the defendant’s wealth is not irrelevant, since considering it is
necessary to create optimal incentives. My point, though, is just that we must
live with some variability, so long as this variability is related to a relevant
consideration. And if it is, then that variation must, in theory at least, be
accepted.
This all leaves open the possibility that a system which appears to the
public to be too luck-based could cause disutility for that reason. To the extent
people find it unfair that compensation is a function of defendant’s wealth (and
the way in which the sum could thus also vary widely from being very high to
very low),144 and to the extent that our intuitions and tastes are that we think it
should be (1) more tied to the plaintiff’s situation, or, perhaps (2) be more
uniform, regardless of whether or how much it looks to the plaintiff’s situation
versus the defendant’s situation, then the answer here about what we should do
thus ties in to the clarification with which I began this Part: We indeed must
fully take into account the utility and disutility caused by my proposal in
practice, and then these results must be weighed together with what I argue are
the efficiency benefits that are brought about more generally, in theory, by my
proposal. How these various effects weigh against each other on net is an
empirical question that I have not yet attempted to answer.
Lastly, the objection stated that the discrepancy between the sums paid to
two similarly situated decedents would be problematic in the same sense that it
would be for discrepancies arising when using an individuated VSL account
because the damages should be the same if the happiness loss is the same. For
my answer to this concern, however, refer to my answer to Objection 1, which
covers this point.
C. OBJECTION 3: WOULD DAMAGES SUMS PRESCRIBED BY YOUR PROPOSAL
NOT BE UNPALATABLY HIGH TOO?
At this point it is important to speak to one proposal/argument that I have
not yet addressed head-on: the proposal/argument offered by Jennifer Arlen that
I mentioned in Part I.C, but which I have not yet addressed. This Subpart (1)
quickly reminds the reader of what her proposal/argument is, (2) provides a first
pass at an explanation of how my account avoids her concerns, (3) provides an
objection she might raise in response to my comments, and (4) provides a
response to her potential response to my comments.
1. Arlen’s proposal/argument. Arlen argues that a damages sum that is
fully compensatory to the decedent would be an infinite number of dollars and

144. Of course, the damages sum is not a function only of the defendant’s wealth. It is also a function of the
happiness loss incurred by the decedent.
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thus that full compensation to the decedent is not possible.145 Relatedly, if the
damages sum were infinite, this would amount to requiring the defendant to pay
all his money to wrongful-death plaintiffs. According to Arlen, however, we
should not seek a compensatory sum, because we would not want to live in a
world where the damages sum were indeed fully compensatory.146 She argues
that we need to take into account that we are all not only involuntary sellers of
our lives but also involuntary buyers of the lives of others.147 In light of this, she
argues, instead of focusing on what a fully compensatory damages sum would
be, we should seek to articulate a damages rule, which would be less than fully
compensatory, and which we would want for our society to implement.148
According to her, a rule of full compensation would result in most productive
activities grinding to a halt because people would fear being bankrupted in the
event that the risk of their causing someone else’s death comes to fruition.149
Thus, she argues, we would prefer to live in a world in which wrongful-death
plaintiffs receive (and wrongful-death defendants pay) less than full
compensation.150 She leaves open the question of what less-than-fullycompensatory sum would be best.
2. My first explanation of how my account avoids Arlen’s concerns. In my
view, my solution enables us to avoid Arlen’s objection/suggestion. She was
operating under the assumption that full compensation would be infinite (or, in
practice, equal in any particular case to however much money the tortfeasor has).
I have argued, though, that the appropriate way to articulate the loss to the
decedent is in terms of a happiness sum and not a monetary sum. This happiness
sum, representing the amount of happiness lost by the decedent, thus is equal to
the “compensatory happiness sum.” Then, I argued that we translate the
happiness sum into a monetary sum on the defendant’s utility curve. Thus, this
amount is the compensatory monetary sum, and this monetary sum is finite.
Thus, according to my account, we indeed are able to identify a finite
compensatory damages sum and we thus avoid the problem that Arlen envisions.
Accordingly, on my view, we need not do what Arlen argues that we must do:
We need not abandon a “fully compensatory sum” in favor of espousing a rule
that articulates a damages sum that is less than fully compensatory.
3. An objection Arlen might raise in response to my comments. Arlen might
respond as follows: Is your proposal not relevantly similar to the type of an
account where we charge the tortfeasor an infinite amount of money? An infinite
amount, or even any finite amount that equals a defendant’s full monetary
wealth, would be too high of a damages sum because it would stunt our ability
to carry out activities in life. Your proposal may still stunt such activities, even
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Arlen, supra note 5, at 1124.
Id. at 1136.
Id. at 1135.
Id.
Id. at 1136.
Id.
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though it does not require infinite damages. If the finite sum it prescribes is equal
to or greater than a defendant’s net worth, then the situation will be identical to
the one I decry, and even if it is somewhat less than the defendant’s net worth,
it still might be a sum that we think is too high and which will stunt activities to
some degree. Or, said differently, we would prefer to live in a world where the
damages sums for these cases are lower—where plaintiffs would receive less
and defendants would pay less. Thus, Arlen might say that even if we use what
my account calls the compensatory sum rather than the compensatory sum she
considered, a rule that provides less than full compensation might still be better.
Thus, in sum, Arlen might say that the general gist of her discussion would apply
almost as much to my proposal and that I thus do not successfully avoid her
objection.
4. My response to Arlen’s potential response to my comments. These
indeed are fair points. But I think that my position succeeds, and here is why.
First of all, I think that employing the damages sum that my proposal
prescribes would indeed bring about the socially optimal amount of care—it is
efficient for the potential tortfeasor to internalize the expected happiness loss of
the victim in his decision making (that is, the probability of happiness loss
multiplied by the amount of happiness loss that the victim would incur if the loss
occurs). Any lower of a damages sum would (by definition) result in sub-optimal
under-deterrence of the potential tortfeasor’s risky activity. This is the case even
if the damages sum would be so high as to bankrupt the potential tortfeasor if
his risky activity ends up causing harm and if he incurs liability. If the damages
sum that my account prescribes deters the (rational and non-risk-averse)
potential tortfeasor from engaging in this activity, then (by definition) this just
implies that it is socially optimal for the potential tortfeasor to not engage in the
activity in this case.
Second, consider activities where the potential tortfeasor’s activity indeed
is socially beneficial on net—where we thus do not want the potential
tortfeasor’s internalization of harm incurred to deter him from engaging in the
activity. In a case of this type, my account’s damages measure, by definition,
does not result in so high of a happiness cost internalized that the (rational and
non-risk-averse) tortfeasor does not engage in the activity. Properly calculated,
this damages sum will not over-deter the potential tortfeasor, and the potential
tortfeasor will still engage in the activity. As for how this point squares with
Arlen’s potential rejoinder, my point here amounts to denying that (rational and
non-risk-averse) potential tortfeasors would actually be deterred from engaging
in the socially beneficial activities that she is concerned that they would be
deterred from engaging in, and, thus, in my view, in these situations, socially
beneficial activities will not actually grind to a halt—contrary to the scenario
she envisions. As for why I do not think that the potential tortfeasor typically
would be deterred in cases like this, it is because, typically, the probability of
the harm coming to fruition is sufficiently low that the expected liability costs
are quite low. I think that Arlen’s potential rejoinder is not sufficiently taking
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into consideration the extent to which the low probability of the harm coming to
fruition lowers the expected happiness cost being internalized.
In addition to this potential source of the disagreement between my
position and Arlen’s potential position (that is, in cases where it is socially
optimal for the potential tortfeasor to engage in the activity), there is one other
potential source of the disagreement, and it arises out of one remaining scenario
I have yet to consider: cases in which it is socially optimal for the tortfeasor to
engage in the activity (and where a rational and non-risk-averse potential
tortfeasor thus would still engage in the activity despite there being a risk of
liability), but where the potential tortfeasor is risk-averse, and sufficiently so that
the expected liability costs deter him from engaging in the activity that it is
socially optimal to engage in.
In this last type of case, the inefficient result (of the potential tortfeasor
failing to engage in the activity that it is socially optimal to engage in) indeed
might be brought about by the damages sum prescribed by my account. In cases
like this, however, the solution is not to alter the damages sum. After all, for the
reasons I have articulated, my account does prescribe the correct amount of
internalization. The problem in the context of the risk-averse potential tortfeasor
lies elsewhere—with the potential tortfeasor’s risk aversion. And this problem
thus can be solved in the same way as the problem of risk aversion gets addressed
in other contexts: with the purchase of insurance (or with the development of a
market for insurance). Accordingly, in order to guard against a “bankrupting”
tort payout, what we want—and could expect—is for the potential tortfeasor to
purchase insurance (and for an insurance market to develop if a market for it
does not already exist). Thus, having bought insurance, the potential tortfeasor
would not be deterred from engaging in the socially optimal behavior, and the
efficient outcome will result.
In my view, as long as the internalization-of-expected-happiness-loss
calculus is carried out correctly, we will get the damages sum that provides
optimal deterrence (neither over-deterring nor under-deterring)—even if the
sum appears high. In some cases, however, risk-aversion combined with the lack
of insurance might result in this damages sum causing over-deterrence. The
solution to this problem, however, does not involve changing the damages sum
(which indeed is optimal); the solution to this problem—which is simply a riskaversion problem that is not specific to the wrongful death context, but, rather,
is much more general—is the same as in other contexts: the purchase of
insurance.151
151. In light of the points I make here about insurance, one might wonder whether purchasing insurance
also could have prevented net-socially-beneficial activities from grinding to a halt even if the damages sum were
higher than the sum prescribed by my account (and closer to the “infinite compensatory sum” considered by
Arlen). See supra notes 145–147 and accompanying text. This depends on what the insurance premiums cost
and on how much of a benefit would be derived from engaging in the activity. (Of course, practically speaking,
even if a damages sum were used that were higher than that which my account prescribes, it could not literally
be an infinite sum.) For my purposes, however, we need not explore whether insurance would prevent society
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D. OBJECTION 4: HOW DOES YOUR PROPOSAL WORK IN THE CONTEXT OF
CORPORATE PARTIES?
Objection 4: You argue that the happiness-to-money translation should
occur on the defendant’s utility curve and thus that the defendant’s wealth is
relevant to determining the damages sum. But many parties in litigation are
corporations or other entities that do not in any straightforward sense have a
utility function, a happiness level, or a disposition, and for which the measure of
wealth might be less straightforward than it would be for a person as well.
Response to Objection 4: This is an important question, and it can be
responded to in various ways, each of which would be consistent with my
account. It seems that the most plausible response will be to use the average
values among all members of the group (shareholders, for example, if the entity
is a corporation) for all of the various categories (for example, utility curves,
happiness sums, dispositions, wealth levels, and so on). Of course, there will
always be a question about how precise we want the data to be and whether we
can simply take averages at a high level of abstraction without determining the
various details for all of the relevant individuals. This, however, is a question
that is not unique to the context of this objection (that is, corporate parties). The
question of averaging among members of groups was addressed in Part III,152
and the analysis there applies here as well. Additionally, as stated there, the level
of detail of data sought could differ in different cases, and there is no single
answer, in the abstract, about how much detail should be sought.

V. OUTLOOK
In this Part, I first explain why, from a forward-looking perspective, in
death cases, we should not only adopt my account in theory, but also implement
it in practice. Next, I expand the Article’s focus to include consideration of the
backward-looking account of tort law and I explore if and how it affects my
proposal. Relatedly, I explain an interesting benefit to exploring the death case:
I show how the death case is uniquely positioned to teach us about the
relationship between forward-looking and backward-looking accounts of tort
law. I then very briefly describe concerns that could be raised about whether my
proposed use of tort law is the best legal machinery we have (as opposed to, say,
criminal law or punitive damages) for pursuing this Article’s goals.

from grinding to a halt if the damages sum employed were higher than that which my account prescribes; it is
sufficient to explore how insurance could interact with a regime employing the damages sum that I argue indeed
provides optimal deterrence.
152. See supra Part III.
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A. FROM A FORWARD-LOOKING PERSPECTIVE, WHY, IN DEATH CASES, WE
SHOULD NOT ONLY ADOPT MY PROPOSAL IN THEORY, BUT ALSO
IMPLEMENT IT IN PRACTICE
In Part IV.A, I noted that while my view is that my account provides
incentives that are optimal in theory, it is consistent with my account that it could
bring about disutility in various forms when implemented in practice. Thus, it
becomes an empirical project both (1) to determine what the effects of my
proposal are in practice, and (2) to determine how to weigh the efficiency
benefits of my account against any disutility that it causes in practice. Thus, as I
said in Part IV.A, it could be that it turns out, at one extreme, that either there is
never any disutility brought about by my account or that the disutility it creates
is always outweighed by its benefits. If so, we should always adopt what my
account prescribes in theory that we do. At the other extreme, it could be that
the disutility caused by my theory always outweighs the benefits it would
provide, and we thus should never implement my account in practice. Instead, it
could be that my account prescribes that we always use the VSL approach, or
some third option. Likewise, it could be that in practice the account would
prescribe that we use a non-individuated rule.153
Although these questions are empirical in nature and working them out is
beyond the scope of this Article, I will here hazard a guess about how these
various considerations might weigh out on net, and thus what my estimation is
of how tort law ideally should treat damages for a decedent’s hedonic loss.
“Ideally” thus does not mean “in theory.” “Ideally” takes into account the
practicalities of the world in terms of, for example, tastes of fairness, particular
preferences, incentive effects, and the like.
My estimate is that it is likely best even in practice to implement my
proposal to determine damages for decedents’ hedonic loss. In short, I think that
any disutility brought about by my proposal in this context would be minimal.
There are a few reasons for this.
For one, consider the potential disutility of my proposal when compared to
the disutility of the current state of the law, to the potential disutility caused by
a VSL approach (an individuated version and a non-individuated version), and
also when compared to the potential disutility caused by a non-individuated
version of my account.
The status quo does not allow for any damages whatsoever for hedonic loss
(in the vast majority of jurisdictions). Despite this omission in the law, however,
there does not appear to be much public outcry or disutility being incurred as a
result. Part of this, perhaps, is due to the fact that there are various other things

153. Recall that, as I have already argued, my proposal is of value for a variety of reasons even if it turns
out that my proposal, in practice, prescribes that the proposal never be used at all. Thus, whether or not my
proposal has value does not depend on the outcome of this discussion. At stake in this section’s discussion is
only how prevalent the cases are where we should bring about reform.
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that wrongful-death plaintiffs can recover for (for example, financial support for
the spouse, consortium, and so on). This is relevant for three reasons.
First, plaintiffs typically are not ending up empty-handed and thus perhaps
they are not left upset about the damages sum; additionally, the fact that there
are various things that can be recovered for might, perhaps, make it the case that
people are not inspecting too closely what dollar sums are for what. Further,
given that consortium or other non-economic damages claims require the use of
exchange rates between happiness and money, and given that it is always
difficult to have strong intuitions about what sums of money are appropriate for
what sums of happiness, there will be a certain sense of arbitrariness present that
will make it difficult for a plaintiff to feel strongly that a particular dollar sum
would have been more appropriate than that which was awarded. Now, if we
also throw in additional monetary damages for hedonic loss (as calculated by
my proposal), it seems as though this (1) would be for the most part a welcome
addition from the perspective of plaintiffs, and (2) for all of the reasons just
described in the context of the current state of the law, it seems as though the
damages sum for this particular component of the overall damages award might
get somewhat lost track of and thus not cause great disutility. Hence my proposal
would represent, in theory and in practice, an improvement over the status quo.
Second, the same is true when we compare my view to the individuated
VSL approach. Similar concerns—for example, the seeming arbitrariness of
damages being a function of level of wealth of one of the parties—would be
considerably more significant with the individuated VSL approach than with
mine. For instance, differing awards for decedents with different levels of wealth
would surely rouse greater intuitions of inequity than differences among
defendants, because it would appear to be attributing differing “values” to a life
in some deeper sense, even if that is not in fact the actual rationale for the
individuated VSL approach. Thus, there is reason to think that the disutility
associated with my account, if present, would be less than the disutility
associated with an individuated VSL approach.
Third, the same is true for disutility of my approach as compared to that
associated with a non-individuated VSL approach and a non-individuated
version of my approach, I think that my account would indeed bring about
greater initial disutility than both of these approaches, but that this disutility
would be outweighed by the efficiency benefits of my account. This is
particularly the case when my account is compared to the non-individuated VSL
account, because of what I take to be the substantial benefits of carrying out the
happiness-to-money translation on the defendant’s utility curve rather than that
of the plaintiff. But I think that the benefits of my account would also outweigh
the disutility as compared to a non-individuated version of my account—even if
less starkly.
Leaving aside these comparisons between the disutility caused by my
account and by others, there is an additional strong reason to think that the
disutility of my account would not be great enough to outweigh its benefits:
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considering the context of punitive damages. As I have stated, punitive damages
typically do take into account the wealth of defendants. This is a key test case.
Just as with my proposal, the particular damages sum in question with punitive
damages is a function of the defendant’s wealth. Further, as with my proposal,
the damages sum for punitive damages does not constitute the full damages
award, but, rather, it is merely a part of it (in my context, there can still be awards
for spousal financial support and consortium, for example, and in the punitivedamages context there are also compensatory damages). In light of the similarity
between these contexts, we can look to the punitive-damages context to see
whether there is public outcry or whether there appears to be disutility incurred
as a result of taking the wealth of the defendant in a case into account, and it
does not appear that this disutility exists. A key feature of both contexts is the
fact there are also other components to the damages award, as stated above. This
likely is key in avoiding disutility, because a party that otherwise might be
displeased can at least feel as though there is still the standard part of the
damages award that does not employ the feature that he dislikes. Then, the aspect
that he dislikes is just part of the award, and this might minimize the disutility
incurred by this displeased party. Further, it could then more easily be
rationalized that “x” is the part of damages award that does “w” (for example,
appropriately compensates the plaintiff), whereas “y” is the part of the damages
award that does “z” (for example, provides optimal deterrence for future
potential tortfeasors). This split could result in less disutility to the displeased
party.
Lastly, while there indeed might be concerns about the administrability of
my account, we deal with similar administrability issues in various ways
successfully when we consider the defendant’s wealth in the context of punitive
damages. As for the questions of happiness quantification, these indeed might
present issues that are new in certain ways, but these questions could be
appropriately dealt with as well if proper procedures are employed, thus enabling
my proposal to be implemented.
In sum, the question of whether or not practical considerations might result
in it being better to not employ my proposal in some or all cases, despite my
proposal being better in theory, remains an empirical question that I do not
resolve here. Despite this, however, the foregoing considerations provide strong
reason to think that, even in practice, we should use my account to determine
damages sums for decedents’ hedonic loss.154

154. Even if my empirical estimate is correct, however, and even if we employ my proposal, we still, going
forward, must keep our eyes open and see if the account appears to cause disutility. If it does (and even if the
disutility does not outweigh the benefits of my account as compared to one of the other candidate accounts), it
could be that it would at that point be wise to make some changes to the rule (even if only minor tweaks) to
reduce this disutility if this can be done without losing too many of the utility benefits of my proposal.
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B. HOW EXPANDING FOCUS TO INCLUDE THE BACKWARD-LOOKING
ACCOUNT OF TORT LAW AFFECTS MY PROPOSAL, AND HOW THE DEATH
CASE IS UNIQUELY POSITIONED TO TEACH US ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN FORWARD-LOOKING AND BACKWARD-LOOKING ACCOUNTS OF
TORT
1.

The Implications for My Proposal of Taking Both Backward-Looking
and Forward-Looking Views into Account Intrinsically

Throughout the Article up until this point, I have been talking almost
entirely about the forward-looking account of tort law—according to which the
purpose of tort law is optimal deterrence (bringing about optimal incentives for
future potential tortfeasors).155 Although I have referred to the backwardlooking account (the account focused on compensation of the plaintiff), I have
only been discussing this account in a particular and circumscribed way. More
specifically, when I have discussed the backward-looking, plaintiffcompensation-focused account, I have only been doing so instrumentally, within
the context of a forward-looking account. In other words, I have been
considering the backward-looking account only for the purpose of considering
the fact that people often have intuitions of fairness156 that comport with a
backward-looking account, and thus that a forward-looking account must take
these intuitions at face value and treat any disutility caused by a legal system
that conflicts with these intuitions as real disutility to be included in the calculus
of determining what rule is optimal.
But this is not the whole picture. The backward-looking view is not merely
a view that is relevant instrumentally because of how it plugs into the forwardlooking view. Indeed, the backward-looking view is the view that many, if not
most, people would say intrinsically describes the main purpose (or perhaps only
appropriate purpose) of tort law.157 And, while perhaps some would think that
tort law is or should be viewed (intrinsically) only through a forward-looking
lens and while perhaps some would think that tort law is or should be viewed
(intrinsically) only through a backward-looking lens, many people would
recognize that both lenses are and should be viewed as (intrinsically) relevant to
tort law. Thus, most people would think that viewing tort law through a
backward-looking lens is at least part of the picture. And because up until now
I have only been considering a forward-looking account, I have not been taking
into account the whole picture. But now I broaden my view and briefly consider
the full picture.
Intrinsically valuing the backward-looking view of tort law (be it either as
the full picture or as part of the picture alongside a forward-looking view) could

155. See supra Part I.A.
156. See Pressman, supra note 17.
157. See, e.g., Weinrib, supra note 25; Coleman, supra note 25; COLEMAN, supra note 25; WEINRIB, supra
note 25; Pressman, supra note 27.
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be a strong reason why in non-death cases we typically might want to use the
plaintiff’s utility curve. See my discussion elsewhere158 for in-depth
consideration of non-death cases and how the theory I propose in this Article
applies in non-death cases. Interestingly, however, death cases are importantly
different from non-death cases with respect to these issues. Absent one thinking
that the estate should be compensated for the decedent’s hedonic loss, the death
case seemingly provides us with a case where compensation is not possible, yet
deterrence is. Thus, even if one typically thinks that the forward-looking and
backward-looking accounts of tort are both intrinsically part of the picture, death
cases are unique in that compensation for (a backward-looking approach to) the
hedonic loss is off the table, and all that remains is deterrence of (a forwardlooking approach to) hedonic loss.
As a result of the fact that, in the death cases, deterrence seems to be the
only game in town, my discussion in Part V.A (about how, according to the
forward-looking view, my account likely should not only be implemented in
theory but also in practice, pending confirmation of my empirical estimates)
indeed seems to be the full picture. And, as a result, my view is that, pending
those empirical estimates, we should indeed implement my account both in
theory and also in practice in death cases.
2.

General Upshots About What the Death Case Enables Us to Learn
About the Interaction Between the Forward-Looking and BackwardLooking Accounts

Although I originally had set out to provide a solution for the death case, it
turns out that the death case is also an interesting case because of what it enables
us to learn about tort theory more generally. This is because it is unique in that
(1) there is a loss incurred by a person that we can quantify (albeit in terms of
happiness and not money), we can calculate “hypothetical compensation,” and
thus we can aim to deter, but (2) our purpose is not also compensation because
the person to whom the compensation would be due no longer exists. As a result,
in determining the damages sum, we can focus on deterrence exclusively. I have
argued, contra the various authors who are proponents of VSL, that when we
focus on deterrence exclusively, it should be the defendant’s utility curve that
we focus on. On the other hand, in cases where the victim is not dead, the
backward-looking account of tort law would typically keep us thinking in terms
of the plaintiff’s utility curve (due both to intrinsic backward-looking
considerations and instrumental ones). As a result, in typical (non-death) cases,
we fail to see that the deterrence aspect of the issue is actually something that
should involve analysis of the defendant’s utility curve.
It is the death case, however, that helps separate the moving parts and thus
helps us arrive at these conclusions. But even once this separation occurs, the

158. See supra Part III.C; Pressman, supra note 17.
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authors who are proponents of VSL simply assume that we should be using the
plaintiff’s utility curve, and this is because we seemingly always use the
plaintiff’s utility curve. But this is a mistake. Once we are focused only on
deterrence, as we are in the death case, we no longer are constrained by the
compensation norm, and we must recognize this and realize that we must then
shift our focus to the defendant’s utility curve.
These insights are important not only for the purpose of bringing about the
best rules in the context of death. In addition, these insights help us to better
understand what is relevant for the purposes of deterrence, more generally. To
the extent that one thinks that deterrence is at least one relevant part of the picture
in cases where compensation is possible, the considerations I discuss here should
inform ways of thinking about how to fashion remedies that in varying degrees,
in different cases, further both a backward-looking goal and a forward-looking
goal.
C. IS MY PROPOSED USE OF TORT LAW THE BEST LEGAL MACHINERY FOR
PURSUING THIS ARTICLE’S GOALS?
Here I only briefly raise the concern that some might have about whether
my proposed use of tort law is the best legal machinery we have for pursuing
this Article’s goals.
For someone who does not believe that tort law should care about forwardlooking considerations at all, then it certainly would seem as though tort law is
not the correct machinery to use. However, even for someone who does think
that forward-looking considerations can be appropriate for tort law, he might
still think that, in this context, other machinery might be better.
For example, one thought might be that criminal law could or should
address this. After all, in many (though not all) of these cases, the risk of death
that the tortfeasor is causing is one that is diffuse and that risks harming large
segments of the population. To the extent that this is the case, one might think
this renders it ripe for criminal law.
There might be compelling reasons in both directions, and I will not further
explore these here. Suffice it to say, though, that if the criminal punishment were
a fine, then the considerations explored in this Article would still be of prime
importance. If non-monetary punishments were considered for this in the
criminal law, then a wide range of other considerations would come into play.
Another thought one might have would be that punitive damages could
satisfactorily bring about appropriate deterrence for hedonic loss. After all, a key
function of punitive damages is deterrence.
First of all, however, the mental-state requirements that typically bring
matters into the domain of punitive damages need not be present in cases of
death and hedonic loss. Thus, the cases lacking these features seemingly would
not be reached by punitive damages. Or, even if we were to make exceptions
and say that all cases of hedonic loss are potentially subject to punitive damages,
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it seems that this would amount to making a change to punitive-damages
doctrine rather than it being the case that all cases of hedonic loss can be
addressed by current punitive-damages doctrine.
Either way, though, this seemingly amounts to somewhat of a definitional
question. In my view, we should not try to get the desired result in these cases
by squeezing them into the punitive-damages domain. Rather, we could coin a
term for a third area of damages that is neither punitive damages nor
compensatory damages: “death damages” or “hedonic loss damages.” There
seemingly is no need to squeeze a new category of damages into one of the
existing categories if the fit is not good and if there is no need to do so.
Leaving aside the question of how to classify these awards, however, there
still remains the all-important question of what the damages sum should be. That
is the important question, and that is the question that this Article has been
addressing. What specific classification we attribute to these damages is of less
importance.
Suffice it to say there are various interesting questions here that merit
further probing. At the very least, however, it does not seem that there is a clear
reason that the tort framework addressed here is not a viable candidate for
handling these issues.159

CONCLUSION
Having one’s life brought to a premature end is seemingly one of the
greatest harms that one can incur, and this is attributable to the decedent’s
hedonic loss, which in most cases probably is immense. This harm, of course, is
irreparable, with no damages sum being able to restore the decedent’s life, but
this does not mean that wrongful-death plaintiffs should not be able to recover
damages for the decedent’s hedonic loss. Whether wrongful-death plaintiffs
should recover for the decedent’s hedonic loss according to a backward-looking
account of tort law is debatable; but what, in my view, is not debatable is that
defendants should be required to pay hedonic-loss damages so that future
potential tortfeasors are optimally deterred when engaging in activities that risk
causing death. If we value our lives and those of others, then this conclusion, I
think, is clear.
How to determine the dollar sum to assign to loss of life, however, is
considerably less clear, and reasonable minds can differ as to which approach to
take. The VSL approach, which is by far the dominant approach, in my view is
159. Another thought that one might have, however, is that there is not even any need for any new treatment
of these cases, because it is a mistake to even think that there currently is under-deterrence of activities that risk
causing death and hedonic loss. Perhaps, one might say, punitive damages for intentional behavior and also
criminal law in many cases sufficiently deter potential tortfeasors. For the reasons discussed in this Subpart,
however, it seems unlikely that criminal law and punitive damages reach all or even most cases of hedonic loss,
and thus it seems unlikely that the current level of deterrence is optimal. Perhaps there are also other avenues
that work to contribute to the amount of deterrence of activities causing death, but, even taking everything into
account, it seems unlikely to me that the current level of deterrence is sufficiently high.
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mistaken for a variety of reasons, three of which are its failings in terms of (1)
theoretical coherence, (2) equity, and (3) efficiency. In its place, I have proposed
an alternative approach that I think fares better on all three of these scores. What
I have presented here is only a sketch, however, and further questions are likely
to arise if it is implemented; but, in my view, there are reasons to be optimistic
that—both theoretically and in practice—the account I have provided will
constitute a step in the right direction.
How will things be different if my approach is implemented? As compared
to the status quo, damages sums in wrongful death cases would surely increase
dramatically. As compared to damages sums prescribed by the VSL approach
(be it individuated or non-individuated), it is not completely clear which
approach would give rise to higher damages sums on average. While there are
many moving parts that affect this, perhaps none would have a larger effect than
the determination made—be it by judges, the jury, legislators, or other
decisionmakers—about which happiness aggregation function is the most
plausible. Other theoretical details remain to be worked out too, however, and
many empirical results and effects remain to be seen. Additionally, if this
account were implemented, it would also remain to be seen how various
industries—such as the insurance industry—would be affected and how parties
would act (and transact) in the shadow of the law.
Despite these many uncertainties, I hope to have re-oriented the
conversation toward a more fruitful path forward.

